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Glossary 
 
 
Amani Talav: Artificial ponds not belonging to any specific village  
Amildar: Native officer in charge of a talook, head of the police and revenue collection  
Brahmin: Person of the priestly caste 
Buckshee: Administrative advisor, head of a department or an office  
Candachar Peons: Soldiers and police recruited from specific castes  
Cutcherry: Office, court or department  
Dana: A tool used by kings to bind support by distribution of wealth to the high castes 
Dewan: The king’s closest advisor, Chief Minister or minister 
Durbar: The king’s court 
Foujdar: The head of a foujdari, a district 
Foujdari: A district 
Gauda: Head man of the village, occasionally head of the local police 
Hoozoor: The king’s administration, a ministerial office 
Jagir: Low rent or rent free land granted for services rendered to government 
Jangama: Lingayat priest, spiritual advisor 
Karnam: Village accountant 
Katte: Tax, customs, duties, a station where duties were levied 
Kandayam: Fixed money rent on land rented from generation to generation 
Kayamgutta: Fixed rent for some period, usually lower than the average rent 
Kuttam: Gathering of a mass of people, usually demonstrating a will or opinion 
Maidan: Lowland Mysore plains on the Deccan plateau 
Malnad: (Meaning: hill country) highland part of Karnatak, on the Deccan plateau  
Musnad: The crowning ceremony, the throne, the rule  
Native states: Semi-independent states controlled by the British 
Pagodas: Monetary unit.  
Panchayat: (Meaning: five people meeting) Administrative unit, often a council or jury of 
five, usually elderly, village council  
Peon: A farmer or servant, usually low-caste, i.e. Candachar peons  
Poligar: Petty Chief, little king, warlord, military leader 
Potail: Village headman 
Ryot: Farmer, cultivator 
Sunnud: Official document, diploma of privileges  
Sarkar/Sircar: (Meaning: head of affairs) The Government or supreme authority 
Sayar: Tax, duties 
Shanbog: Village accountant 
Shraya: Reduced Kandayam for a certain period of years  
Sheristardar: Head of an office or department, a secretary, subordinate of the amildar 
Shist: (Meaning: discipline and order) Local land revenue in Nagar 
Shurtee: (Meaning: supposing a talook is contracted for). System of contract hiring 
Sowcar: Wealthy man, moneylender 
Talook: Subdivision of a district, under the management of an Amildar. 
Thugee/thug: A bandit, a criminal, from the word thug meaning a member of a gang of 
stranglers  
Waram: Arrangement with hired labourers from the villages nearby cultivating the land for a 
return share of the produce.  
Zamindar: Person responsible for revenue collection in his domain  
Zamindari: Revenue estate, supervised by a zamindar.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
This thesis deals with the Nagar rebellion, in colonial South India. In late August and early 
September in the year 1830 disturbances broke out in the province of Nagar, a district located 
in the northwest corner of Mysore kingdom, a Native state under indirect British imperial 
rule. This small uprising soon spread to most of the districts, also called Foujdaris, in Mysore, 
and became a Kingdom wide insurrection. Most of the mass gatherings of peasants, referred 
to as kuttams, consisted of farmers and village servants, and were easily dispersed. However 
the fighting lasted for almost a year in the province of Nagar. Here the poligars, who were 
former chiefs and local rulers, a pretender named Buda Basveppa and adventurers joined the 
peasant uprising, armed with muskets and employing mercenaries recruited from Southern 
Maratha country. Internal conflicts and shifting alliances between leading Maratha Brahmins, 
the royal family and others in the administrative departments and at the king’s court worsened 
the situation. Brahmins are the priestly caste, regarded to be the highest ranking in the caste 
hierarchy. 
 
The British East-India Company, which from now on will now be referred to as the Company, 
intervened, first with advisors and non-interventional military presence, then later with active 
regiments of native infantry and cavalry, supported with artillery. In June 1831 most of the 
insurrection was quelled and on the 19th of October the same year Krishnaraja Woodeyar III – 
the Rajah – surrendered his rule peacefully to the Company. A British Commission of 
prominent Company officers took over, and Mysore was directly governed by the British for 
the next 50 years. In 1881 governance of Mysore was given back to limited Native State rule, 
controlled and supervised by the Crown. 
 
The problem at hand 
 
My main question in this thesis is: what causes lay behind the Nagar rebellion and how can 
these be explained? The fact that this question has only been partially answered by historians 
justifies its asking. A few scholars have loosely discussed the causes of the outbreak of 
rebellion in August 1830, and here I aim to present the different theories and discuss them – 
though I find few of them satisfying in answering my main question. The specific questions I 
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pose are many and complex. I will make precise some essential questions and then present 
possible answers that can serve as a basis for answering the main question. 
 
Following a major event many historians will look for causes to explain what happened, so 
that one can fully understand the incident. After a rebellion one can believe that the purpose 
of the uprising was to attack something or someone, or in other words; that the rebellion was a 
protest or a way of showing disapproval, possibly against the authority of the state. What or 
who was the Nagar rebellion aimed against? What was the political, economical and social 
situation where the insurrection took place? These are the first questions that seem relevant to 
answer. I will propose in this thesis, that the rebellions were invested with an ideology, which 
means that the uprisings were not only directed against something, or someone, but also that 
the people that rebelled were in favour of an idea or in favour of a change of situation. The 
rebellion presented an alternative to the administration in Mysore and Nagar. Revolutions can 
aim to tear down existing structures and at the same time introduce a substitution. What did 
the rebels, or the rebel leaders, in Nagar desire and what did they want to put in the place of 
their opponents? I will seek to answer these questions by investigating the ideas and structures 
behind the insurrection. 
 
The primary sources and the secondary literature suggest that the influence from the polity of 
the Keladi State, that ruled Nagar up until 1763, had impact on the rebel mentality. Ranajit 
Guha believes that most common uprisings in India in the period from 1783 to 1900 were 
partially motivated by an idea of a historical golden era.1 This theory is supported to an extent 
by Burton Stein.2 However, Burton Stein claims that the Nagar rebellion differed from Guha’s 
models because the use of ideology based on a romanticising of history was more apparent in 
Nagar than in other areas, and that this ideology was well founded before the uprising. At the 
same time Burton Stein emphasizes contemporary economical and administrative factors as 
causes of the insurrection in Nagar. What part did ideology play in the Nagar rebellion, both 
as a trigger to the uprising and also in the popular mobilisation that followed? Lowland 
Mysore, called Maidan, and highland Mysore, called Malnad, in where Nagar was situated, 
had traditionally been two separated regions, differing in economy, culture, ethnic and 
religion. From 1763, the rulers of the Mysore state attempted to assimilate, into a politically 
                                                 
1 Ranajit Guha, Elementary aspects of peasant insurgency in colonial India, (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 1999) 
2 Burton Stein, ‘Notes on ‘peasant insurgency’ in colonial Mysore: Event and process’, A SOAS South Asia 
reader, D. Arnold & P. Robb (eds.),  (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1993) 
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larger unit, an area circumscribing almost to what is known as Karnataka of today. From the 
difference in traditions between Nagar District and the rest of the Mysore state, it seems 
natural to ask the following question: did the people of Nagar experience a communal 
belonging to the Mysore state and were they loyal to the king? 
  
Mysore was an independent kingdom, bound to the Company through a subsidiary alliance – 
signed at Sriringapatnam in 1799. Krishnaraja Woodeyar III, the Rajah, was the head of the 
state. One might ask if the rebellion was directed against him and his officers in the 
administration. A Committee of Company officers was put down subsequent to the 
insurrection to investigate ‘“The Origin, Progress, and Suppression of the Recent 
Disturbances in Mysore” and “the consequences by which they have been attended, as 
affecting the lives and property of the people and the general prosperity of the Country”’.3 In 
‘The Committee’s Report’, it pointed out that Rajah had to be blamed for the uprising, 
because of his economic mismanagement and lack of control with local officers, a situation 
these officers took advantage of, thus creating an intolerable situation for the peasants, which 
again led to rebellion. As I will look into later, the Committee also assumed that these 
administrators protected each other. Perhaps the Rajah was not aware of the conditions of his 
kingdom? Or was he unable to do something about it? The first assertion put forward here is 
interesting; that waste of public funds led to a strain on the state treasury that demanded 
increase in revenue, and therefore risk of uprising. Assertion number two, regarding lack of 
control of the administration, brings many aspects into the discussion, most importantly; was 
the administration itself a direct or indirect cause to the rebellion? If the Rajah lacked control 
of the local officers in Nagar, it might be imprecise to emphasize the Rajah’s economic 
policy, since he then did not have control of local factors that lead to dissatisfactions in Nagar. 
Can we than claim a causal connection between Rajah’s policies, especially his economical 
policies, and the Nagar rebellion? A different angle to this question will be to claim, that if the 
Rajah lacked control over his civil servants, he was not aware of the population suffering an 
increased burden of taxation. Therefore, he did not know how to act differently. However, 
politics is not just economics, nor was the Rajah’s economic policy only concerned with 
personal spending. We might therefore ask if a king’s responsibility, or dharma, the 
attendance to duty and devotion, is to rule efficiently and attentively and perhaps claim that 
his vacant rule indirectly caused the insurrection.  
                                                 
3 ‘Report on the Insurrection in Mysore’, December 1833 
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 To answer these questions I will investigate the relation between the administration on one 
side and the population, mainly the peasants, on the other side. How did this relation influence 
the outbreak of kuttams and how did it carry the insurrection further? Areas of focus will be 
the structure of the Indian administration and the revenue collection, mainly in Nagar District.  
 
Historiography and research status  
 
Native States in the early 19th century South India, under British imperial rule, have been the 
object of historical research. On a broad scale, Thomas R. Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), explores British imperial ideology and 
British justification of rule. Burton Stein, Thomas Munro, The origins of the colonial state 
and his vision of Empire, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), gives us an understanding 
of the Company’s approach towards the Native States in South India in the first decades of the 
19th century. David Ludden, Peasant history in south India, (Delhi: Oxford university press, 
1989), outlines generally the local structures of production and administration in South India 
in a broad historical perspective. 
 
Of special importance to my thesis, concerning local administration in 19th century South 
India, in his a case-study on Guntur district, Robert Eric Frykenberg, Guntur District 1788 – 
1846, A history of local influence and central authority in South India, (Oxford: Oxford 
university press, 1965), explores and discuss history of local influence in its meeting with 
colonial administration – including the elite croups and shifting power-bases of elites and 
castes. Neelambar Hatti and James Heiman, ‘The rule of Law and Dharma in Early 19th 
century South Indian Villages’, Lund Papers in Economic History, 5/96, focus on 
administration on the village level. Pamela Price article, ‘Cosmologies and Corruption in 
(South) India – thinking aloud’, Forum for development studies, (Norway: no 2, 1999), 
examines corruption in South India in an historical context. The role of native rulers, local 
kings and petty chiefs in 19th century South India is explored by several authors: Pamela 
Price, Kingship and political practice in colonial India, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), ‘Ideology and Ethnicity under British Imperial Rule: 'Brahmans', Lawyers and 
Kin-Caste Rules in Madras Presidency’ Modern Asian Studies 23, (Great Britain: 1989) and 
‘Varieties among polities in early modern South India’ (Oslo: Universitetet i Oslo, 1984), are 
some. The paper, ‘Dana as an instrument of state policy in pre-colonial and colonial South 
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India – perspectives from the native state of Mysore’, (India: Unknown year and place of 
publishing), gives an analysis of kings’ tools for binding of loyalty – with a special focus on 
Krishnaraja Woodeyar III. Suzanne Hanchett, ‘Hindu Potlatches: Ceremonial reciprocity and 
prestige in Karnataka’ in Helen E. Ullrich (ed.), Competition and Modernization in South 
Asia, (New Delhi: Abhinar Publications, 1975), describes potlatches as a method to gain 
personal prestige advancement in various ways inside and outside caste, kinship and 
patronage institutions. 
 
Local history of the Nagar area, with attached importance to Keladi, is increasingly produced 
in Karnataka. The revival of local historical interest is seen in Shimoga district today, but the 
published books are rarely distributed outside the borders of Karnataka. K. N. Chitnis, ‘Keladi 
Polity’, Research publications series 17, (Dharwar: Karnatak University, 1974), G. S. Dikshit 
Studies in Keladi history (Bangalore: Mythic Society, 1981) and Mrs. Patel, ‘State, peasants 
and land revenue – A scientific approach of a native state in pre-colonial South India’ 
(Bhadravti: Not dated), are idiomatic studies on Keladi history – works almost impossible to 
find outside Karnataka. 
 
Common elements in rebel consciousness in Indian peasant insurgencies are worked on by 
Ranajit Guha, Elementary aspects of peasant insurgency in colonial India (Durham and 
London Duke: University Press, 1999), and ‘The prose of counter-insurgency’ in Ranajit 
Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies II, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983). The Nagar 
rebellion is just briefly described in general presentations of Mysore history. Nigel H. M. 
Chancellor, Mysore: The Making and Unmaking of a Model State, South Asian Studies, no 13 
(1997), discuss the 19th century Mysore with some attention to the significance of rebellion. 
However, when it comes to the Nagar rebellion, there are written two articles on the subject: 
Burton Stein ‘Notes on peasant insurgency in colonial Mysore: Event and process’, South 
Asia reader, (Curzon Press, 1993), and one article written by the Mysorean historian 
Sebastian Joseph: ‘A service elite against the peasants – Encounter and Collision (Mysore 
1799-1831)’ Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Bombay Sessions, (1980).  
 
However, no major full-scale study on the Nagar rebellion has been carried out. Indications 
are that few historians in or Karnataka, South India, want to approach the subject. It seems 
that certain members of the royal family or other groups of prominent people, perhaps still 
holding influence and respect, could be embarrassed by what the sources might disclose. My 
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study reveals the ‘voices’ of persons that participated in the incidents in Mysore, especially in 
Nagar District, in 1830 – 31. My contributions to the studies of 19th century South India 
Native States are to increase our knowledge on several areas: Firstly, we observe the details of 
the rebellion, given in the sources. Secondly, we identify the causes to the rebellion, and 
attempt to recapture them. Thirdly, we learn about the persistent resistance of former little 
kings, in a 19th century South Indian Native State, and similarities to contemporary processes 
of resistance in neighbouring areas in South India. Fourthly, we explore what the insurrection 
tells us about the nature of governance in Mysore. Lastly, we learn about the administration of 
Nagar District and recapture the conditions that made it special in a relation to the governance 
of Mysore. 
 
The sources and their problems  
 
A Committee was put down a few months subsequent to the insurrection, consisting of 
prominent figures, namely Major-General Thomas Hawker, William Morison, J. M. Macleod 
and Mark Cubbon. This Committee was given the mandate to investigate the insurrection in 
Mysore and submit a report concerning the events and the consequences it carried upon the 
State of Mysore. I have chosen to write a thesis based upon research on selected primary 
sources. My primary sources are the Committee’s notes and minutes, including interviews and 
letters, the Committee’s final ‘Report’ and letters from the involved parties and persons.  
 
The Committee carried out an examination of all the available documents and also collected 
statements from witnesses. It sat together for more than a year. In December 1833 a report 
was given to the Governor-General in Council, Lord William Cavendish Bentinck (1828 – 
35). This document and the 1717 pages of notes and minutes constituting their complete work 
are my most important sources in the following thesis. 
 
There are methodological problems concerned with ‘The Report’ of 1833. ‘The Committee’s 
Report’ can be seen as a tool for Company justification of the British inclusion of Mysore into 
the British Empire after 1831. The Company administrated, or ruled, the Mysore state when 
the investigation for ‘The Report’ was carried out, and required political justification for the 
occupancy of Mysore. It seems that when constantly remarking on the faults of Krishnaraja 
Woodeyar III and pointing out the mistake of not interfering earlier, the Committee was 
legitimising the Company take over of Mysore.  
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 ‘The Committee’s Report’ was written based upon oral statements from witnesses involved 
with the incidents in Mysore and Nagar. Circumstantial evidence shows that some of the 
witnesses did not tell the truth or slightly altered the truth to suit themselves or their agenda. 
One person was proven to lie in front of the members of the Committee. Ram Rao, a person 
of high rank in the Rajah’s administration, deliberately attempted to falsify his statements 
when he tried to conceal a name in a document he was called in to comment. 
The commission consider it incumbent on them to remark on a flagrant act of 
misconduct and breach of duty on the part of Ram Rao, …, who when called before 
the Committee this day for the purpose of reading a public record, connected with the 
Examination of Buckshee [a title] Syed Salar, falsified it, by wilfully omitting in two 
successive readings, the name of an individual, which it was subsequently ascertained 
was borne on the record.4
Some witnesses do not remember what happened even though the incidents should have made 
an impression upon them and took place less than two years before they were called in to the 
Committee. It seems that much relevant information was not revealed. Some of the witnesses 
were peasants or village-leaders, known as potails, who participated in the rebellion. Other 
witnesses were officers, both British and native, who played a part in military operations, and 
others were local and central representatives of the regime. The narratives of these categories 
of witnesses whom often figured among the protagonists were probably biased and these 
witnesses’ role in the events must be regarded as partial. Perhaps, no witness was truly 
unbiased. Some of the witnesses faced their new employers, a situation which most likely 
moderated their statements. However, the interviewed persons came from all layers of society, 
thus balancing each other out. Several witnesses supported each other’s statements, possibly 
increasing their reliability. The sources are reliable in the sense that I can use them to outline, 
answer, elaborate and conclude concerning the questions in the following chapters. 
 
Outline  
 
I have presented and discussed the questions, historiography, the primary sources and the 
Committee that investigated the rebellion. The next chapters will be on Mysore kingdom and 
Nagar Foujdari, giving the historical background and relevant facts about royal governance, 
                                                 
4 Statement from the Committee, in the ‘Committee papers’, p. 282 
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administration and the Kingdom’s economy. Then I present a narrative of the events of the 
insurrection and an analysis of the causes. My last chapter will be a discussion of the 
administration of Nagar including the alleged corruption, criminality, intrigues, and the local 
officers’ relations with Rajah and his court. 
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2. Inclusion of Mysore in the British Empire  
 
 
When using the general term British, I will usually refer to a British citizen at official duty in 
India – generally a representative of the British East-India Company. This chapter deals with 
the Company approach towards Mysore and the inclusion of Mysore in the British Empire. 
 
The Company was established as a trade monopoly in 1600 A.D. with the sole purpose of 
joining the European race for Indian resources. At the expense of the slowly disintegrating 
Moghul Empire, the Company gained an expanding foothold in India throughout the 18th 
century, using the tools of trade, force, bribes, diplomacy and technological superiority. 
Bengal and Orissa came under direct Company administration at an early stage of the colonial 
era. Following the battle against the ruler of Bengal at Plassey in 1757, and the defeat of 
French forces at Wandiwash in 1760 Great Britain became the dominating actor among the 
European colonial powers. The Company was now not only a trader, but also a ruler – from 
the end of the 18th century until independence in 1947.  
 
During the 18th and the 19th centuries, large parts of South India were composed into a 
conglomerate of small and medium states. Ideally, the Company was committed to practising 
a policy of non-intervention, though this did not occur in reality. With the coming of Richard 
Wellesley, Lord Mornington, who served as Governor-general in 1798 to 1805, the British 
moved away from this policy. Wellesley desired to establish the Company as a supreme force 
in India and coerce native rulers into acknowledging this. Treaties, designed by Wellesley 
himself, usually called subsidiary alliances, were signed with most of the small kingdoms. 
These states were described as Native States or Princely States by the British administration.5 
These treaties required that native Indian rulers had to accept Company supremacy, could no 
longer freely choose their own foreign policy, were not allowed to wage war without 
Company sanction, and could only employ British citizens or persons approved of by the 
Company. The purpose of the treaties was mainly to prevent foreign influence in the region. 
The local ruler also promised to keep a self-financed military force in state of readiness, at 
British disposal. A Company representative, the Resident, was to be stationed at any time with 
the local ruler’s court, to supervise implementation of the treaties and influence the 
                                                 
5 K. L. Khurana, History of India, 1526 A.D. to 1967 A.D., (Agra: Lakshmi Narain Agarwal, Agra, 1995), pp. 84 
- 88 
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administration of the state. In return the Company was bound not to interfere in internal 
affairs and to protect the state from aggressive external forces.6
 
The Company became involved in the affairs of Mysore when it entered into conflict two 
Muslim sultans ruling the country from 1761 to 1799 – Haider Ali and his son Tipu Sultan. 
The diplomatic play and shifting alliances turned toward British advantage, the war slowly 
impoverished the Kingdom and in the long run the Company's soldiers were far superior to 
the sultan’s. Tipu Sultan suffered defeat and died defending his capital at Sriringapatnam in 
1799. A Committee composed of Company officers, namely General Lieutenant Harris, 
Colonel Arthur Wellesley, Henry Wellesley, Colonel Lieutenant Barry Close, Colonel 
Lieutenant William Kirkpatrick and the Nizam (king) of Hyderabad concurring, appointed by 
the Governor-General outlined the British policy for Mysore in the partition treaty between 
the Company and the state of Hyderabad. Large areas were ceded to the Madras Presidency 
and to the state of Hyderabad. The articles 4 and 14 of the treaty provided the Company an 
opening to assume control of Mysore in case of neglect, especially concerning revenue 
deficit.7 The treaty also stipulated the re-instalment of a former Hindu dynasty – the 
Woodeyars – with the minor Rajah as formal regent and his Dewan Purnaiya as de-facto head 
of state. A Dewan was the king’s closest advisor in state matters – comparable to a Chief 
Minister. According to the treaty the British Resident was placed in Mysore representing the 
Company. ‘The drafting of the ’model’ subsidiary treaty for a new Mysore in 1799 identified 
British needs precisely; cash, supplies and special forces.’8 In addition to a monthly cash 
payment the treaty also committed Mysore state to supply a permanent force of 4000 irregular 
cavalry, a subsidiary force, also called the Mysore Horse or Sillidar Horse, available for allied 
operations.9 The partition treaty was in Purnaiya’s time reckoned by the Company to have 
become a success far surpassing all expectations and was used as the foundation for the 
British take-over of Mysore in 1831. 
 
The British influence  
 
                                                 
6 K. L. Khurana, History of India, , p. 86 
7 M. H. Gopal, British Sources of the economic, Political and Social History of the Mysore State, Volume I 1799 
– 1812 Purnaiahs Administration, (Bombay: Popular Prakashan pvt ltd., 1993), p. 43 
8 Nigel H. M. Chancellor, ‘Mysore: The Making and Unmaking of a Model State’, South Asian Studies, no 13, 
1997, p 112 
9 Nigel H. M. Chancellor, ‘Mysore’ p. 112 
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The general premises for the Resident’s situation were specified in the early years of 
Purnaiya’s reign. He was an extension of the Company and meant to be just an advisor to the 
Rajah: ‘superintend the management of their internal affairs for the good Government of their 
countries and the improvement of their revenues.’10 His position was regularly evaluated and 
changed, but always carefully intended to be non-interfering – and carry no further tools of 
sanction than information to Madras and warnings to Rajah about consequences of poor 
administration. The interaction between the Resident and the Rajah was the central meeting 
point between the Governments in Mysore and Madras – in periods the only one. Company 
influence almost ceased after Rajah reached full age and legal capacity, with only the 
Resident’s counsel and advice left as instruments of influence.  
 
The peasants occasionally attempted to bring forward complaints and grievances to the 
Resident. Many of the witnesses from all classes told the Committee that Mr Cole (1808 – 
1825) listened to the ryots and visited the countryside where he communicated directly with 
them. He was known to have an open house, granting everybody audience. However, 
according to Runga Rao, amil of Honelly, the succeeding Resident Mr. Casamaijor (1825 – 
1834) only replied: ‘You must go and see Rajah’.11 He refused to receive complaints and 
rarely met ryots in person – thus representing a thorough non-interventionist policy aimed to 
function according to his mandate. ‘The advice and counsel of the British Government should 
only be apparent to the public eye when coming directly in aid and support of the Native 
authorities.’12  
 
On the other side, Cole’s previous open house policy was not without complications. A 
witness described that persons who complained were menaced by being told that they would 
be imprisoned if they dared to bring their complaints to the Resident.13 The stigma visiting the 
Resident could bring harassment and prosecution. In the years of Mr. Casamaijor’s term as 
Resident, from 5 years prior to the insurrection, ryots seeking audience at the Resident’s 
department were often not allowed to meet anyone; they were just escorted back to their 
respective villages by guards. The Company carefully avoided the unfortunate situation of 
being caught between interests. The shift in policy with the change of Resident from Mr. Cole 
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to Mr Casamaijor was noticeable and sent signals of British passivity to the elites surrounding 
the Rajah. 
  
A cutcherree was a department or Government offices. The Resident’s Cutcherree depended 
upon the service of native servants. Company officials were mostly trained in Persian and 
Hindi, and sometimes Marathi and Tamil. But rarely did they speak the language of Kannada, 
spoken in Mysore.  
As a consequence, the essential need for accurate intelligence about the Raja's 
Government was compromised at the outset. …from 1811 to 1825 the Resident's 
senior staff and translators were invariably relations and connections of Rama Rao, the 
dominant Maratha service Brahmin.14
Mr Casamaijor’s closest advisor, the Sheristardar Chowdiah, was regarded as one of the most 
influential persons in Mysore.15 A Sheristardar was often a secretary of the person leading a 
department. In the districts the Sheristardar was the Amildar’s subordinate in charge of the 
revenue collection. Chowdiah’s position as the Resident’s representative was utilized by him 
and his collaborators to alarm the Rajah. Several witnesses claimed that Chowdiah fabricated 
instructions from the Resident in order to get things done the way he and his associates 
desired. The Resident was invisible and kept in ignorance, and Rajah kept in awe. 
 
The British approach towards Mysore  
 
During the period from 1820 to 1828 Thomas Munro held the office of Governor of Madras. 
He was one of the most influential participants in the debate about British colonial policy. 
Thomas Munro was both visionary and pragmatic on behalf of the empire, motivated by the 
contemporary debate in England  
He imagined an India governed by powerful statesmen whose minds and careers had 
been shaped in India, but whose authority was to derive from ministers of the British 
Crown. ... Crown rule, then, was a first condition for achieving the future that they 
saw. Delegation of royal authority to vice regal officials in India – like themselves 
[Munro and Malcolm] – was a second condition. Together, these constituted the first 
principle of a British imperium. A second principle was that direct rule over all of 
India should be eschewed, even if it were possible to attain. India must constitute a 
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whole and separate political sphere made up of a system of states under the 
hegemony of British India.16   
Inspired by Edmund Burke, Munro claimed that several strong competing states, rather than 
only one dominating force, including the British, would contain a more efficient and stable 
political order. In such a system all independent states would learn from each others mistake 
and develop together. ‘…he seemed to think that the Indian subcontinent could become a 
sphere of interacting states.’17 Munro sought a decentralised political control with the Princely 
States rather than one single supreme power located in Calcutta. On these grounds Munro 
developed an inclusive policy towards the native rulers, a policy reflected in his tolerant view 
upon traditional local institutions.  
 
This tolerance towards native rulers included the affairs of the Mysore state, wherein he 
became strongly involved in the 1820’s. However, the Government of Madras had watched 
the situation in Mysore since the Rajah had assumed power. In a letter from the Government 
of Madras to the Rajah, dated the 30th of August 1814, we can see signs of growing British 
discontent. The Rajah was warned about the consequences of an emergency, even though 
British involvement into state affairs of Mysore was not mentioned directly.18 In the 
beginning of the 1820’s the Resident called attention to the decreasing revenue income. He 
pointed out that approximately 7.3 million surplus pagodas (Mysore state currency), gathered 
by Purnaiya, were spent and that the state’s income was lower than its expenses. All the 
departments were in deficit.19 The Mysore economy worsened during the 1820’s and Thomas 
Munro involved himself in the affairs. 
The principal cause for the increased expenditures of Krishnaraja was royal largesse, 
the granting of money and land to those deemed worthy of royal patronage and 
prestation. As a proportion of gross revenue collections in Mysore between 1799 and 
1823, royal grants nearly doubled from 7 per cent in the last year of Purnaiyas 
administration to 13.5 per cent in 1823. At this point Munros attention was seized.20
In 1825 Munro wrote a famous minute in which ‘A major question was raised by the growing 
administrative and fiscal chaos in Mysore.’21 Munro expressed that he wanted to persuade the 
                                                 
16 Burton Stein, Thomas Munro, The origins of the colonial state and his vision of empire, (Oxford University 
Press, 1989), p. 348 
17 Burton Stein, Thomas Munro, p. 349 
18 ‘Report on’, p. 10 
19 ‘Report on’, p. 12 
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Rajah to assume control of the situation. In another letter, the same year, he again expressed 
his concern and repeated his desire to sway the Rajah in the right direction. In September 
1825 he visited Mysore to stress that the option of sanctions given in Treaty of 1799 would in 
the worst case, allow the Company to take full control of Mysore: ‘There he had delivered a 
stern lecture to the Mysore ruler on retrenching his extravagances lest the discontent among 
his subjects, and especially his soldiers, boil into outright rebellion. ...The prospects for the 
state were very unfavourable’.22 Thomas Munro’s advice to the Rajah for more sober 
spending and increased control of state affairs apparently brought about some changes and the 
Company was for a period convinced that the development headed the right direction. 
Optimism was expressed in letters from the Resident. However, only two years later 
expectations dropped again. The Committee wrote in ‘The Report’: ‘Such a state of things 
could not be suffered to continue without its leading in a very short time to the measure which 
it is so desirable to avert, of assuming the direct management of the Rajahs country …’23 
Inspired by his open and tolerant policy, Munro avoided a confrontation with the regime of 
Mysore Kingdom. As Burton Stein noted, ‘For this indulgence of a client state Munro was to 
be criticized by his successor Stephen R. Lushington [1827 – 32] in 1831’.24 The insurrection 
broke out in September 1830 and after a few months of chaos Company troops intervened to 
quell the disturbances. Krishnaraja Woodeyar III peacefully surrendered his rule to the 
Company 19th October 1831, but continued to reside in his palace in Mysore.25 Company 
take-over of the Mysore state administration lasted for the next fifty years.  
 
The British plan was to restore princely rule rather than to innovate or reform.26 However, as 
in most cases of British colonial occupancy, they chose to stay. With the coming of James A. 
Broun-Ramsay, the Earl of Dalhousie (1848 – 56), as Governor-General of the Company in 
1848, the principle of upholding and protecting Princely States was thrown away. He 
determined to take advantage of every just opportunity presented to consolidate British 
territory and absorb Princely States.27 The argument was that the ‘backwards and despotic’ 
princely Governments were inferior to ‘enlightened’ British rule.  
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The Rendition  
 
Mysore was governed by British Commissioners from 1838 to 1881. This period brought 
peace and stability to the country and the economy improved gradually. In 1843 the Company 
abolished the post of Resident. In the period from 1834 to 1847 all decisions concerning the 
future of the dethroned Rajah were postponed by the Company Government. No one took 
responsibility, even if most contemporary political actors spoke favourably of the Rajahs 
claim to the throne. Krishnaraja Woodeyar III grew old and sought once in a while to regain 
the rule of Mysore. But he was childless and the British initially refused to accept his plans of 
adopting a son, even though appeals on his behalf were put forward by British politicians. 
Some political thinkers accused the Crown, who had gained complete rule over the Indian 
colonies subsequent to the Mutiny in 1857, for being unwilling to return power once obtained. 
In the end the British finally accorded Krishnaraja Woodeyar III the right to adopt an heir. 
After his death, and when his son Chamrajendra Woodeyar X came of age, on the 25th of 
March 1881, Mysore was handed over to native administration, not native rule. This was 
called the Rendition. The new Maharaja received rights of heritage and was invested with 
limited power over all Mysore territories. 
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3. Native Government 
 
In this chapter I will describe the native Government of the Mysore state from 1799 to 1831, 
Purnaiya’s and the Rajah’s rule. The state’s administration and revenue system will be 
elaborated. 
 
Purnaiya and Krishnaraja Woodeyar III  
 
The experienced Purnaiya still held the position of Dewan, acting practically as sovereign, 
and executing royal power in from 1799 to 1811. Purnaiya was a Maratha Brahmin, as were 
most of the other advisors in the administration around the Rajah.28 The Company chose him 
for the task because of his experience as Dewan serving Haider and Tipu and also because he 
was obliging toward the Company. He was considered to be a professional administrator 
devoid of political views. Sebastian Joseph has observed: ‘Purnaiya was a typical example of 
an elite adept in the art of accommodation and survival by changing loyalties in a most 
astonishing and successful manner.’29  However, the Dewan was not without political 
interests. His agenda was to make his post inheritable and hence pass the position on to his 
son. The Resident informed the Governor of Madras in 1808 that Purnaiya occasionally 
expressed this desire. In 1810, as a reward for his services, the old Dewan was only granted a 
jagir corresponding to 10000 Canteroy pagodas, whereupon he chose the area of Yelandoor.30 
A jagir is a low rent or rent-free land granted for services rendered to Government. The 
British praised Purnaiya for his statesmanship, sober economical policy and for saving 
money:  
Purnaiyas system of Government was no doubt absolute; ... the accumulation of 
surplus revenue presented itself to him as a prime end to be attained. It may be 
questioned, therefore, whether he did not to some extent enrich the treasury at the 
expense of the State, by narrowing the resources for the people; for by 1811 he had 
amassed in the public coffers upwards of two crores [A crore is 10 million] of 
rupees.31
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At the end of his regency, Purnaiya was less cooperative and acted in a hostile manner 
towards the Rajah, when the latter petitioned for more influence. According to the Resident, 
Rajah felt ashamed of being locked up in his own palace, instead of being the active ruler of 
his own country.32 He was worried that Purnaiya would to keep him as a marionette. Shortly 
following a conflict on the question of the employment of a specific officer, the situation 
turned into a crisis. In 1811, when Krishnaraja Woodeyar III reached the age of 16, Purnaiya 
was forced to resign. The Rajah demanded full responsibility of rule, and claimed, in 
agreement with the Resident and the Company, that he was mature enough for the job. This 
signalled an instant and major shift in the running of state affairs, and later a change in the 
British approach towards Mysore. Purnaiya died in March 1812, shortly after his resignation. 
The Committee remarked: 
The interference of the Company's Government in the internal affairs of Mysore 
during the administration of Poorniah [Purnaiya] did not extend beyond the aid which 
was afforded by the Resident in the form of advice; and it seems probable that even 
this kind of interposition was less frequently employed in the latter than in the earlier 
part of the period [of regency].33
The Company continued the same policy towards the Rajah, in whom – at first – they held 
full confidence. They praised his handling of the conflict with the much older and experienced 
Dewan, and they described him as a wise adult. Madras had high hopes for the Rajah.34
 
Krishnaraja Woodeyar III was installed in a crowning ceremony, a Musnad, on the 30th June 
1799, at the age of four. The 2nd of July the same year the Kingdom of Mysore was 
proclaimed.35 In his childhood the Rajah lived a protected life surrounded by advisors 
handling decision-making concerning state affairs. Yet, in other ways he was thrown into an 
adult world early. Krishnaraja Woodeyar III married already as a little boy, but his first wife 
died in April 1802, when he was 7 years old. In 1806 he married again. He was brought up to 
become a king, but at the same time sheltered from learning the reality of ruling, a 
development much controlled by Purnaiya. After the insurrection in 1830, questions were 
raised about Purnaiya's upbringing of the Rajah.36 As the authors of ‘The Report’ speculated: 
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The struggle made by Poornaiah to retain his supremacy over the Rajah, and the 
irritation which attended it may reasonably be supposed to have operated with 
considerable influence in the formation of His Highness character and to have 
confirmed that jealous fear of supercession in power, ... which he is stated to have ever 
afterwards evinced, by withholding from his ministers, ..., the degree of authority 
necessary to make them useful instruments of Government, and by resisting and 
resenting the counsel of the Resident ...37
Krishnaraja Woodeyar III commenced his rule under favourable conditions, with a filled state 
treasury, the Company’s best wishes and hopes for his country and without external enemies. 
As a youth he was regarded by the British to be talented and strong, but shortly after 
Purnaiya’s resignation their opinion altered. The Committee suggested that the Rajah was not 
fit to rule a country and that he was never able to control state affairs, in particular the 
finances. The Committee referred to ‘defects of his character’.38 The Committee asked 
whether it would have been possible to reverse this trend in a positive direction, but concludes 
that it could not have been done: ’... he never could be converted into an upright, ingenious, or 
steady man’.39 The Committee claimed that it would have been too late to improve, in 
particular, his skills of economic management. Severe critique was passed on Krishnaraja 
Woodeyar III after British takeover. 
 
The noticeable and obvious reason for growing British concern was his extravaganza, waste 
of public funds on personal luxury goods, his acquaintance with what the British described as 
‘foul characters’, his neglect of public services, including the military, the decreasing revenue 
income and the accumulation of public debt. Already in 1813 and 1814, in letters from the 
Resident, the Rajahs bad habits were described: ‘[The Rajah] had fallen into habits of 
extravagance and sensuality, wasting his treasures upon the wretches who pandered to his 
pleasures even by prostitution of their wives and daughters.’40 The Resident expressed 
concern for the young ruler and fear of misadministration. In a letter dated the 19th of 
February 1814 the Resident wrote that the Rajah had fallen under influence of Brahmins and 
that he constantly falsified documents and accounts, and that it was difficult for the Resident 
to procure facts about the Rajah’s management of state affairs. The Committee wrote that the 
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young Rajah did not pay attention to the Resident’s advice from as early as 1814 and after.41 
Not long after the Rajah assumed responsibility, the surplus of the state treasury was spent. 
Much wealth vanished abroad. The Rajah used large sums and great parts of the income on 
presents and jewellery for himself and his court. Burton Stein emphasise this. 
… [T]he accumulated surpluses of the kingdom were ‘dissipated’ in acts of royal 
largesse – gifts to Brahmans and court favourites, temples and mathas [Hindu 
monasteries] – in an ... effort to establish his personal credentials as the ruler of the 
kingdom after his tutelage and eclipse by Purnaiya.42
The Company only observed gifts as “extravaganza” and immediately classified gifting as 
unnecessary spending. However, Rajah exercised the affairs according to his duties and 
devotion – his dharma – or moreover what he perceived as his duties and devotion. Kings of 
South India wished to reproduce royal honour and status, which they felt were smouldering 
away after introduction of British supremacy.  
In the nineteenth century, in the context of a new type of overlord, these elements of 
fragmenting tension would prove destructive, contributing to the fragmentation of 
precolonial monarchical cosmology. The desire to reproduce royal honour and status 
was a dynamical element in continuing evolution of monarchical ideology in the 
course of the nineteenth century.43
Redistribution of wealth might be the King’s way to tighten alliances and support from 
important classes and castes. Pamela Price describes it as a king’s negotiation for support.44 
To maintain stability, implement jurisdiction and to exercise state authority the rulers built 
alliances and cooperation with Brahmins, represented in ministers and bureaucrats, and as 
priests and scholars.45 The Brahmins had spiritual power and received respect. They exercised 
administrative skills and had access to divine powers in close ties with Kings. On the part of 
the ruler, it was important to keep the Brahmins satisfied, by distributing parts of the state 
recourses to them as well as to the temples or temple towns. This could ensure continuous 
loyalty from the people.  
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The Rajah manoeuvred in a minefield throughout his whole period as ruler, and he stepped on 
some of the mines from time to time. He spent a lot of money, often more than the annual 
income, and he did not succeed in securing support from the people or in preventing 
economic crisis. As I will point out later: only relatively small number of associates and their 
dependants enriched themselves on Rajah’s distribution of wealth. Vencata Kistniah, Foujdar 
of Manjarbad, answered the Committee: ‘[Question] Because of Rajahs expenditures would 
not the country have been rich? [Answer] What have the ryots got by the Rajahs 
expenditures?’46
 
The state of Mysore faced a recession in the 1820’s – circumstances which will be dealt with 
thorough in chapter six. A state spending less money than it collects might propel itself into 
recession since less money in circulation will reduce the demand on goods and labour. Thus 
the surplus state treasury could have been a factor influencing Mysore economy in the time of 
the Rajah’s reign. ‘That hoarded fortune, amounting to about five times the annual revenue of 
the country, was rapidly spent by the raja after ridding himself of Purnaiya in 1810.’47 But 
Mysore’s economy went into a decline. The writers of ‘The Report’ accused the Rajah of 
letting corrupt elements run loose and the Rajah allowed corruption to increase at an alarming 
rate, putting more pressure on the peasants for revenues.48 All the interviewed people claimed 
that Rajah was a kind and good man, but nobody defended his administrative skills. 
 
Mysore administration  
 
I will first generally describe the administrative system of Mysore, with a special focus on the 
revenue collection. Land was the major source of wealth and collection of revenue was the 
single most important aspect of Government concern – the rulers dominating imperative: 
‘Stability in collection of revenue is the main goal and the administrative apparatus an 
instrument in achieving this goal.’49 The interaction between the Rajah and his ministers all 
the way down to the local administrators in the Foujdaris sub-divisions, called talooks, went 
through a relatively static system that can be described as a ‘hierarchical branching network 
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of nodes’.50 We may call the system static because, according to Hatti & Heiman, this 
administrative revenue model rarely changed its character, though different rulers came and 
went. ‘These nodes of revenue collection, at whatever level, were ready for anyone with 
power and influence to tap into.’51 However, when the revenue collection was assured, the 
local power holders were given freedom to handle other matters on their own. Most aspects of 
administrative affairs are described in this chapter as a supplement to better understanding of 
the dynamics of the Mysore state organisation, both, in Nagar District, and centrally.  
 
Villages and panchayats 
 
The village was the central unit of production in South India in medieval times, remaining so 
up until today. Some scholars have described the village as never changing: ‘the isolated 
“village republics”, which had subsisted and reproduced themselves “from time immemorial” 
as though sealed in a time capsule’52, whilst others have claimed it was evolving slowly and 
constantly.  
 
The village servants, numbering up to 12 different persons in various positions, performed 
practical work, like guarding, washing and sweeping. Their salary was usually food or land. 
The headman who often was the renter of the village, called gauda or potail, and the village 
accountant, the shanbog or karnam, were the most prominent persons, and their offices were 
generally hereditary. The latter did the village accountancy regarding cultivation, and 
interacted with revenue officers. Throughout the late 18th century and the early 19th century 
Brahmins had taken many of these positions in Mysore, especially in Malnad. The headmen 
were usually closely tied to the Amildar and in a way representing him. 
 
Villages and castes in early 19th century South India had a panchayat, an advisory or decision-
making council, usually consisting of elder men. A village panchayat was made up of men 
from the dominant caste. They took decisions concerning local administration, social 
organisation, economical strategy and questions related to cultivation on a daily basis. The 
panchayat were also in contact with state officers and district officers, for instance the 
Amildars. The panchayat had a larger role also, often functioning as a court that could be 
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appointed in special cases, either by a superior officer, or by the disputing parties 
themselves.53 Panchayats were used on nearly all levels in the state organisation. During the 
rebellion they were assembled to judge special cases concerning rebel activity, as which 
happened after the battle of Honelly, where 99 persons were hanged. 
 
The administrative hierarchy  
 
The districts, called Foujdaris, were divided into talooks. A talook is a limited geographical 
area containing villages. The Amildar governed a talook. He was the head of police, had a 
limited jurisdiction, and most important. he was the local revenue collector. The Amildar was 
the peasant’s link to the state though he did not always interact with the village headmen 
directly. Sometimes he sent Sheristadars or other servants from the Amildar’s cutcherree to 
deal with business at village level. The Foujdar was the head of a Foujdari and superior to the 
Amildars, supervising them in administrative matters. All Foujdars were supposed to be 
appointed by the Rajah, in counsel with his advisors. The Foujdar was also head of the 
military in his district, and most important: he overlooked the revenue collection executed by 
the Amildars. He had to realize the collection at the stated periods of payment. If any criminal 
activities or disturbances were reported it was his business to investigate, deploy troops and 
make necessary arrangements. He should also attend to the complaints of the ryots.54 Hoozoor 
was the Rajahs central administration, consistent of appointed members. It served as the daily 
counsel of affairs, executing royal orders. The term Hoozoor was also used to describe a ruler 
of the highest rank and the offices and appointments close to him. In the Hoozoor in Mysore, 
the heads of departments sat, and the royal will and the authority over the districts met and 
formed a single institution. The Durbar was the Rajahs court – an assembly, or a council 
meeting, comparative to a parliament, where the Rajah held audience. The Rajah led 
assemblies in the Durbar hall, where he resembled a divine authority. 
 
The law courts 
 
The civil judicial department was altered when the Rajah assumed power, inspired by the 
model of Madras Presidency. Three different courts handled civil cases on different levels, 
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and one court, the Adawlut, dealt with the magisterial department. All of the courts were 
headed by a chief judge and had separate organizations. The proceedings were: Statements 
were taken from the plaintiff and the defendant, and sentences passed by judges. Fees were 
levied upon suits.55 Traditionally, criminal justice such as theft, robbery, highway robbery and 
murder, were much left to the local headmen and the panchayats. Severe crimes were inquired 
into by the Amildars and sentence passed by the Hoozoor. Under the Rajah the Adawlut was 
supposed to handle all cases of serious crime, but in practice the local Cutcherees, the 
Amildar’s departments, continued to handle such cases. This gave the Amildars and Foujdars 
extensive control of local affairs.  
 
Corporal punishment was much used in the criminal cases; for instance scarring, mutilation 
by cutting of ears and noses, whipping and hanging. Indications are that the use of severe 
corporal punishment increased in the last years of Purnaiya’s reign and increased even more 
in the Rajah’s time.56
 
The Rajah lost control of local affairs and physical security diminished. Centrally the courts 
became infiltrated by members of different factions protecting their dependants and relatives, 
and influence was exercised upon the judges when the Rajah allowed the factions at the 
Durbar to influence decisions. In his ‘Report on Civil and Criminal Judicature in Mysore’, 
Mark Cubbon observed: ‘...the orders of the Court issued upon its ordinary business to the 
various Cutcherries, began to be neglected by the public officers of the State; the minions of 
the Durbar increased their interference, ...”57 The courts came in bad repute and, follow 
Cubbon: ‘It is currently believed, that every person about the Durbar at that time, however 
low, used to intermeddle in the suits, and to attempt to influence the decisions of the 
Adawlut.’58 The Rajah was inconsistent and allowed himself to be moved in different 
directions from day to day. Sometimes the Rajah interfered in specific cases, thus creating 
confusion: 
It has likewise happened that, in the same suit, as many as four or five contradictory 
decrees, in addition to the original decree of the Court, were successively passed by 
the Rajah himself, just as the influence of the one party or the other, predominated at 
the Durbar; … nothing remained which was fit to be called the administration of 
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justice.... Questions of property were also decided by the Rajah in person, without any 
record of the investigation, or any decree.59
The Rajah had authority to change this development; however he did not use this option. The 
courts of justice had limited power to pass sentence in serious cases of crime, only authority 
to judge the question of guilt. However, the Rajah, who retained the right to pass sentence, 
was unaware of the situation. ‘The jails remained for years crowded with prisoners who, if 
guilty at all, were only guilty of light offences.’60  
 
Land tenancy and revenue 
 
A Potail, or a Gauda, who rented a village, collected the revenue from the cultivators and 
delivered it to the Sircar.61 Sircar was the term for the Government and/-or supreme authority. 
The Potail was responsible for the revenue income and for fulfilling his contract. The most 
common revenue system was the Kandayam, fixed money rent on land rented from generation 
to generation. The Waram arrangement was organised with hired labourers cultivating 
specified land for a return share of the produce. The ryots were occasionally forced to 
cultivate waram lands. Tanks, artificial ponds, called Amani Talav did not belong to any 
specific village. The lands connected to these tanks were cultivated by ryots from surrounding 
villages, and super superintended by public servants. Other systems were rents that favoured 
certain individuals, for services, grants, pensions etc. The holders of Shraya paid reduced 
Kandayam for some years before entering a common contract while Kayamgutta was fixed 
reduced rent for a certain period. Jagirs, landed estates, were almost free land, or very low 
taxed land, and commonly used as rewards or grants for services.62
 
In January or February, the Amildars or the Sheristadars made an estimation of the crop 
outcome, in consultation with the renters, usually for both the November and the May yield, 
and at the same time fixed the Government rent, the Kandayam. The rent averaged to 1/3 of 
the gross produce. In Chittledroog the rent was 18 % above that level. In Nagar the Kandayam 
was 3% less than average, however, since the agricultural charges were higher than elsewhere 
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in Mysore, the surplus to the peasants came out 9 % below average.63 The distinguished 
system in Nagar, called shist, I will describe later.    
 
Shurtee and its consequences 
 
The shurtee system was introduced in Mysore in the early 19th century with the goals to 
increase cultivation and increase the revenue. This is how Colonel Welsh described it in 1830: 
Sharti was a contract made by the Amildar that he would realize for the Government a 
certain amount of revenue; that if his collections should fall short of that amount he 
would make good the deficiency and that if they exceeded it the surplus should be paid 
to the Government. The amount which the Amildar thus engaged to realize was 
generally an increase on what had been obtained the year preceding.64
The Amildar offices were sold to the highest bidder and the Amildars were bound by 
contracts to make good any unforeseen deficiency and also pay the surplus revenue collected 
to the Government. The Amildar was bound not to oppress the ryots, not to impose new taxes 
and not to force the farmers to buy the Government's share of grain. The binding shurtee 
contract applied to the Amildar’s talook and he was personally responsible for its fulfilment. 
The candidates opting for a shurtee contract could, and did, overbid each other in an open 
competition for situations. The evaluation of the candidates was done by the Rajah and his 
advisors. The person with the best offer was supposed to win the contract. Theoretically the 
candidates had to be qualified for the job also, however, often bribes and favours between the 
involved parties decided the outcome in cases where highest bid or qualifications did not. The 
writers of ‘The Report’ thought it natural that a Government in economical and moral decline 
would resort to use such a system: 
Nothing seems more natural than that a weak, vicious, and ignorant Government, 
finding its revenue annually decrease, should ascribe the decline entirely (whether 
with justice or not) to the mismanagement and corruption of its officers, and conscious 
of its own inaptitude for vigorous efforts to correct those sources of the evil, should 
seek to check it by resorting to an expedient like this.65
The shurtee system functioned as a no-win situation for all involved parties – the state, the 
officers and the peasants. The Government were pressured from excess spending and drop of 
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income. The Amildars were pressured to fulfil their contracts, which goals often were not 
feasible, and yet they obliged themselves by the agreements not to impose increased revenue 
and extraordinary taxes on the cultivators. In this complicated situation, trapped inside the 
spiral of continuously increasing revenue, irregularities occurred. The distance from the 
capital to the Foujdaris, especially Nagar, is a crucial point. When out of reach from Hoozoor 
and protected by kin, it was easier to make up for disadvantaging contracts. The Amildars 
usually promised too much, but under these protected circumstances, they still expected to 
increase the kandayam each year. 
This precaution however did not prevent the system, according to the evidence of all 
the witnesses who have been examined regarding it, from operating to the decided 
disadvantage of all the parties concerned, of the Government, even with respect to the 
amount of revenue; of the people, and generally of the Amildars themselves.66
Most of the witnesses interviewed for ‘The Report’, regardless of status in the administrative 
and social hierarchy, confirmed that the Amildars levied unlawful taxes and pressed the ryots 
continuously for increased revenue. The practice of offering positions to the highest bidder 
and the expectancy of increased revenue in successive years impoverished both farmers and 
Government.  
The shurtee system proved in this way exceedingly injurious of the interests both of 
the Government and the people; and its pernicious operation was farther aggravated by 
... that of removing Amildars as often as other persons came forward with offers to 
realize a larger revenue. This is stated to have been carried to such a length, that if any 
person made a higher offer even within a year in which the Amildar in possession had 
entered into his engagement and obtained his appointment the latter was removed and 
the office given to the former.67
Even high ranked state officers who gained advantages and enriched themselves, realised how 
dysfunctional and unprofitable the system became. Vencata Kistniah, Foujdar of Manjarbad, 
told the Committee that the shurtee system was the reason for the downfall of the Mysore 
economy, when he stated: ‘…it is from this plan of setting the land to the highest bidder that 
the country has been injured and became the occasion of loss.’68  
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The system led to further decrease in state income, and as a consequence the Government 
blamed what they regarded was corrupt officers. The Rajah attempted to investigate and 
correct district officers, however, the main obstacle for investigation was that officers 
supported each other and prevented investigation of family members and dependants. The 
Amildars occasionally lost money and positions when they did not fulfil their contracts, and 
without the right connections higher up in the administration, they certainly risked their jobs, 
with the humiliation that followed. The Amildars were frequently removed to make room for 
others.69 However, the Amildars had full control of their talooks in their period in office, even 
on short time assignments, and they had tools to press the cultivators. The Maratha Brahmins 
that filled nearly all the positions as Amildars in the 1820’s ended up as mere revenue 
collectors instead of administrators. But even if the Amildars were under pressure and 
frequently replaced, the peasants suffered the greatest distress. The Amildars kept the surplus 
collected, because it seems that the shurtee was a system, not intended to, but designed for 
collection of as much revenue as possible.  
Some of these officers indeed, finding that their predecessors had embezzled a 
considerable part of the revenue they had collected, or that through remissness they 
had omitted to procure payment of sums due to the state, were able to collect more 
than they had engaged for, and appropriating the surplus to themselves, 
notwithstanding the reserved right of the state to it, made a considerable profit by their 
undertaking, either without making undue exactions from the people, or besides the 
gain of such exactions.70
 
Sayar and forced labour 
 
To be able to obtain the promised revenue, the Amildars had additional means to increase 
their income, such as overrating of crop production and forced sale of grain to excess prices. 
There were several different taxes, tolls and duties levied on goods, also called sayar. B. 
Lewis Rice described the system: ‘It is said to have been no uncommon thing to reward a 
favourite by the imposition of a new tax, or the institution of a new katte [literally meaning: a 
station where duties were levied].’71 The number of stations, spread all over Mysore, which 
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levied duty on goods in transit on high roads, in and out of towns and on consumption was 
761. There were hardly any goods, whether luxury or necessities of life that were not taxed.72  
In fact stranger merchants were practically debarred from entering the country, and the 
whole of the trade, such as it was, became monopolized by the Sayar contractors or 
their servants, and a few practiced traders who were in close alliance with them or 
knew how to command powerful interests at the Darbar.73
The holders of rights to levy sayar were usually added to shurtee contracts; however, the 
system differed from district to district. Contracts were auctioned, sometimes forcing the 
renter to borrow money from the sowcars, the moneylenders, and then to work harder to pay 
his debt and thus be put under pressure to press for profit. Many people were involved in this 
chain; the Government of Mysore, the renters, sometimes sub-renters, the sowcars and the 
ryots. All of them, except the ryots, sought to make profit on sayars.  
 
In addition, according to ryots interviewed, the Amildars imposed extra taxes and extra work 
on the ryots, for instance collecting of firewood and tobacco.74 Kurree Buswiah, a peasant 
from Honelly talook, told the Committee that the ryots had been forced to pay rents for waste 
land, a practice unknown in the days of Purnaiya, and ‘Being unable to pay the increased 
taxes we assembled in Cootum. [Kuttam]’75
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4. Nagar District 
 
 
This chapter gives the historical background of Nagar District, Keladi Kingdom and the 
poligars, in addition to a brief description of its population and religion. Nagar District was a 
separate Foujdari in 1830, but is today a part of Shimoga district. Nagar is situated in Malnad 
country, in the hilly area in and bordering the Western Ghats. In 1830, Nagar was both a city 
and the name of the surrounding talook. The city of Nagar – today barely a sleepy provincial 
town – was in the 18th century the commercial centre of the district and of military 
importance, with a fort and a garrison.  
 
Population and religion 
 
The population of Nagar Foujdari in 1830 was slightly less than 300 000. Nagar was less 
inhabited than the surrounding districts due to the area’s diminished importance. Brahmins 
constituted 7 per cent of the Nagar population, a number which was significantly higher than 
in other districts. 
 
The branch of Hinduism called Virasaivism was the state religion in the Kingdom of Keladi, 
and continued to be the influential religious force dominating the area of Malnad, as well as 
other parts of South India. The followers were called Lingayats. They comprised at the most 
about 30 per cent of the Nagar population. The district had a distinct identity. However, 
Maratha Brahmins controlled almost all high offices in the administration. The impact of 
religious difference created a strong local solidarity in Nagar District, among the elites and 
headmen in the villages, and also among the population in general. Burton Stein claims that: 
‘Virasaiva solidarity was a major element in the coherence of the uprising in the Malnad and 
involved co-sectarians from across the border in southern Bombay.’76  
 
A distinct history: Keladi Kingdom 
 
The province of Keladi was formed as a buffer zone on the fringe of the famous Vijayanagar-
kingdom – supposed to function as a fortified bulwark between this empire and external 
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enemies. Chaudagauda (1499-1513), a Vijayanagra officer, was ceded a small area in the 
Malnad from which the state of Keladi rose in a period when the central powers of the 
Vijayanagar state gradually lost control of the autonomous warlord provinces at the rim of the 
empire.77 During the slow decline of Vijayanagar these warlords assumed high titles and 
dignities and established their local power bases as little kings. The Keladi state became fully 
independent in 1639, ruled by the descendants of Chaudagauda Nayak, and supported by local 
chiefs, the traditional local nodes of power in the Malnad from then up to late 18.century. The 
royal family adopted the title Nayak, a word which became synonym with the title king, after 
the fall of Vijayanagar in 1565. 
 
The area of the Keladi kingdom corresponded to the districts of Shimoga, Mangalore and Goa 
of today and thus included the Foujdari of Nagar where the rebellion took place. Nagar town 
was a prosperous centre in the kingdom and also the capital for a period, though the capital 
shifted between Keladi, Ikkeri, Bhuvanagiri and Nagar, the latter being capital when Haider 
conquered the last Keladi king in 1763. At that time Nagar had around 100 000 inhabitants. 
The Keladi kingdom was ruled by a line of 16 successive Nayaks from 1499 to 1763, 
including the legendary Queen Chennamma (1671-1696), and the infamous Shivappa Nayak 
(1645-60), who is still remembered in the area as a great reformer and a local hero. The 
Muslim sultan Haider Ali incorporated the Keladi Kingdom into the state of Mysore. After the 
fall of Tipu Sultan in 1799, Nagar remained a part of Mysore, in accordance with the Treaty 
of 1799.  
 
The Muslim rulers of Mysore attempted to integrate the total area of Malnad into greater 
Mysore, because of its resources and strategic position as a buffer towards the warring 
Marathas to the north. But the elites and local lords, the poligars, of Malnad resisted cultural 
and political integration under the domination of Maidan as long as it was possible. 
 
Nagar, the last capital of Keladi Kingdom, had traditionally been the richest centre in 
Malnad.78 The products produced and exported were gold coins, precious stones, betel and 
spices. In 1830, both the town of Nagar and the Foujdari were slumbering places, with not 
much left of former prosperity. The court of the Nayaks had been forced to dissolve and the 
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elites had moved away from the city. The Resident Barry Close wrote to the Governor-
General Lord Mornington, on the 2nd of November 1799, stating that ‘From appearances the 
town of Nuggur [Nagar] at no very remote period must have been immensely populous but ... 
has fallen into decay.’79  
 
The shist 
 
The most celebrated of the Keladi Nayaks’ is the legendary Shivappa Nayak. The distinctive 
land revenue system Shivappa Nayak introduced was called shist. This was a permanent 
assessment. The property of soil was vested in the landholder, while in other parts of Mysore 
the system was generally based upon hereditary right to cultivation.80 K. N. Chitnis has 
written about shist: ‘The institution of private property in land was recognized in Keladi. […] 
the people owned their own lands in Keladi. On many occasions, the king purchased lands 
from the people. Sometimes the people purchased them from the king.’81
 
The Amildar proceeded to the villages in the beginning of the year to determine the general 
state of cultivation and concluded the rent with the potails. If all the land of any ryot was kept 
uncultivated, the revenue of that land was remitted. If a part of the land of one individual was 
cultivated, no remission was allowed. The Waram arrangement was not used much.82 The 
cultivators paid the revenue to the Government via the head man or the village accountant.83 
The assessment was fixed and rarely altered. The Government share was 1/3 of the produce, 
plus a fixed money rent, taken on a rough estimate of the seeds sown or the ploughs used. The 
Government had no further interference with the cultivators. This assessment was kept 
unchanged by Shivappa Nayaks successors, except when minor extra taxes were levied. The 
land was divided into five different categories, dependant upon the fertility and quality of the 
soil. This assessment was simple and popular. This practice of shist continued until Haider Ali 
reformed it in 1764. On the establishment of the new Government of Mysore in 1799, the 
landholders of Nagar attempted to restore the shist, an arrangement they were granted in a 
moderated form: ‘Shivappa Nayak’s Sistu assessment was so popular in Malnad and Coastal 
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areas of Karnataka that it remained as standard until the beginning of the colonial rule in the 
region.’84 Shivappa Nayak is romanticised in history writing in Shimoga district.  
He used to encourage cultivators ... by advancing loans and by constructing irrigation 
works like, tanks and canals. ... He also abolished all illegal rural taxes ... the policy of 
land revenue adopted by the Keladi State was modern in character and scientific in 
approach. ... It was in no way less liberal and less efficient than the subsequent 
Thomas Munro's system of land revenue administration in the region. ... It was not 
oppressive in character.85
This strong historical memory and identification with the past in Nagar District, was alive in 
Purnaiya’s and Rajah’s time. Chancellor’s article confirms the impression that the history of 
Keladi made remarkable imprint on the people of this region and ‘a strong impression of the 
lasting identification with the old kingdom of Keladi amongst inhabitants of this 
extraordinarily beautiful and dramatic area.’86
 
Under the Rajah’s regime shurtee was introduce to Nagar by the newly immigrated Maratha 
Brahmin administrators. They established a hybrid revenue-model new to the area, with much 
of the same consequences to revenue collection that applied to the rest of Mysore. Shurtee 
also permitted the rights to collect Sayar in Nagar District to be divided between different 
persons and rented by the highest bidders, who sometimes again let sub-renters handle the 
business, thus creating a system with many profiteers involved.  
 
An ideological platform: The poligars and the pretender 
 
Local Keladi identity surfaced in the late 18th century and was reshaped by the insurgent 
Nagar poligars. Burton Stein points toward that the strong recollection of earlier times and 
tradition mostly had its function as an ideological platform, and that it was a major factor in 
the rebellion. 
The persistent independence of the raja of Nagar and the various palegararu of the 
large upland between the Western Ghats, where Nagar nestled, and the eastern upland 
portions of Karnataka adjoining the Ceded Districts of Madras, had hardened during 
the late eighteenth century. ... In 1830 it was the reawakening of the earlier political 
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opposition to Malnad people to the domination of the Mysore Durbar that appears to 
have been crystallised.87
Traditional poligar authority had been gradually broken by Haider Ali and Tippu Sultan 
before 1800. However, the descendants of the Keladi kings, the poligars, lived and acted with 
some degree of authority on the edges of the Mysorean administrative system. In 1830 two 
persons from different families claimed to be heirs of the old line of local Keladi rulers. One 
of them was an elder man called Rungappah Naik, a descendant of the last Keladi ruler. He 
lived for many years together with his son Hanoomuppah Naik and nephew Surjappah Naik, 
collecting a state pension. These men were known as the Terikkery poligars. Rungappah Naik 
carried no formal power, but exerted strong influence. The peasants presented him donations 
and gifts in the conventional manner of honouring superior authority.  
 
Another person that came to be titled poligar was an adventurer. Based upon a falsified 
hereditary right, Buda Basveppa, also called Rajah of Nagar, claimed his right to the throne of 
Nagar. He was the most active adventurer participating in the insurrection.  
I heard that a person calling himself the Nuggur Poligar had rebelled against the 
Mysore Government and that he was not a descendant of the Nuggur … He was a 
Cultivating Ryot in the Village of Jumagutty of the Coomsee Talook of the name of 
Hyagamullah but having obtained the seal of the ancient Nuggur family the Ryots 
styled him “master or Rajah”.88
His real name was probably Sadara Mulla.89 Born as a son of a ryot from Kumsi talook, a few 
kilometres from Shimoga, Buda was a notorious small scale criminal before he turned twenty. 
He had participated in robbery and looting, and previously spent two years in prison. After he 
served this sentence he came connected to an old Jangama, who had, through his profession 
as a priest and spiritual advisor for the late Keladi ruler, got hold of the Nayak’s signet rings.90 
Following the Jangama’s death, Buda Basveppa obtained these rings and used them to create 
a manufactured background for himself. During the next years he expanded the story until it 
included status as the rightful heir to the throne of Nagar. At the occasion of his own wedding, 
in April 1830, he claimed the title ‘Nagar Khawind’, meaning ‘Rajah of Nagar’. The exact 
date of this ceremony is given in the sources. ‘Basveppa’, his surname, was also false. He 
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took this name from the city where the Terikkery Poligars originated thus adding to his own 
name a glow of royalty.91  
 
Buda received acceptance for his background by showing a false sunnud [royal document] 
bearing his new name: ‘Buda Basveppa Nagar Khawind’. This document, ‘...a sunnud of the 
Company's Government, recognizing and sanctioning his hereditary pretensions to the 
sovereignty of Nuggur’92, was actively used to gain recognition. Buda claimed the throne just 
prior to the first kuttams. He took advantage of the displeasure that increased amongst the 
ryots in mid-1830 and he therefore gained supporters and became the figure head of the 
rebellion. Buda promised the ryots reduced rents and compensation for losses. The writers of 
‘The Report’ claimed that Buda played the most prominent role in the following insurrection.  
The next chapter includes a narrative of the insurrection, including a summary of the 
explanations, as to its causes. 
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5. The insurrection  
 
 
The course of events from August 1830 to July 1831 is unclear and difficult to determine 
exactly, since our knowledge is based upon statements from witnesses with differing views on 
the affairs. 
 
The Rajah’s perhaps closest advisor and experienced servant since 1811 was Ram Rao. His 
journey to Nagar in 1827 is central to the understanding of the tight bonds between the 
Amildars in Nagar and their patrons in Mysore. The story shows us also how a party of 
Maratha Brahmins connected to Ram Rao played an important role in the insurrection and 
also how the peasants came to be distressed.  
 
Ram Rao travelled to Nagar Foujdari in 1827 accompanied by Vencata Kistniah, a civil 
servant who later became the Foujdar of Manjarbad. In Nagar they investigated the decrease 
of revenue from that district. Ram Rao’s son-in-law Kishen Rao was the Foujdar of Nagar at 
this time. The peasants complained that rents were demanded on waste lands, that the 
Amildars distressed them greatly, and that they used torture to exact payment.93 Ram Rao 
enquired into the circumstances and admitted rent remissions amounting to almost 750 000 
rupees. At the same time he consolidated the Amildars allegiances, which afterwards gave 
them an opportunity to press harder for the rents. 
 
The Rajah received information that the remissions made by Ram Rao were unnecessary and 
uncalled for. Rumours among the officers not connected to Ram Rao’s party were that the 
remissions only served the purpose of ‘integrating his own people in the talooks with the 
Ryots’94 and strengthen his dependants’ positions in Nagar District. It was also rumoured that 
Ram Rao himself benefited from the remissions, most likely through bribes and gifts.95 
Corruption was suspected and this episode provoked a number of reactions in the central 
administration. One of the Rajahs relative’s, Veera Raj Arus, was appointed as the new 
Foujdar of Nagar. He held the office for two years until Ram Rao’s party managed to regain 
the position. Veera Raj Arus instigated inquires concerning ‘... the alleged frauds of the 
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Buckshee [the title of Ram Rao], and the abuses of the preceding Foujdars, as well as of the 
Amildars of that party, when he was suddenly recalled to the Durbar.’96  
 
When Veera Raj Arus started his investigations, he assumed that he had received a mandate 
from the Rajah to collect the outstanding debt that was earlier remitted by Ram Rao. This 
provoked strong dissatisfaction amongst the potails and peasants, causing disturbances to 
break out. Vera Raj Arus had tried to probe into a web of crime and corruption, when he came 
close to sensitive information harmful to the party of Ram Rao and his dependants. Ram Rao, 
who is believed to have been one of the Rajah’s most important advisors for a period of more 
than 20 years, had the power to alter the outcome of investigations in the state of Mysore and 
to alter the management of Nagar District as it suited him. Veera Raj Arus was recalled to 
Durbar and Kishen Rao was again put in the position as Foujdar of Nagar. This replacement 
took place while the rebellion was at its height; therefore we might assume that there were 
additional explanations for the removal of Veera Raj Arus. He could not quell the rebellion 
and the Government wanted a strong military leader in this state of crisis. Kishen Rao, who 
had been fired due to corruption in 1828, was reinstated in November 1830. However, he was 
removed again two months after, which we will se later in this chapter. 
 
A blanket of unrest had covered the Malnad area since the spring of 1830. The peasant’s 
disapproval of new taxes, forced labour, increased rent, injustice and incompetent Amildars 
and rumours of the coming a new Rajah of Nagar, indicate a general dissatisfaction and 
instability. Further, these factors seemed to be significant in contributing to the kuttams that 
sprung up in August 1830. 
 
Buda Basveppa did not just wait to observe what happened. In the beginning of August, one 
of Buda Basveppas commandants, Monnapah, led an attack on the fort at Anuntapoor, in 
Nagar District. His army was only 200 men strong – a mix of local ryots and mercenaries. 
This was the first outright hostile act towards the Government. Though this attack failed, it 
was the first of many violent clashes between the rebels and the Government. 
 
The peasant uprising broke out in Nagar Foujdari. Buda Basveppa had exited the ryots and 
encouraged them to protest against the Government since the time of his wedding in April. In 
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August a letter from the ryots of Nagar was distributed to the neighbouring talooks. This 
letter, besides encouraging people to gather in kuttams, called on everyone to: Refuse to pay 
rent on land, stop cultivating the land, end all trading, and arrest and contain public officers 
and bring them to the kuttams. In the following months the insurrection spread rapidly. In 
August and September 1830 the ryots assembled in kuttams several places to express their 
displeasure with taxes and rents and to protest against the oppression from the Amildars. 
The discontent was fomented by a pretender to the Bednur throne, named Budi 
Basveppa, who formed insurgent bands; and these again were shortly joined by 
Rangappa Nayak, the head of the Tarikere family, and by numbers of thugs, 
professional stranglers.97
Buda Basveppa and Rungappah Naik campaigned for support from the peasants. The peasants 
again spread the word of rebellion and the insurgency spread to most districts all over 
Mysore. In December 1830, Bangalore, Chittledroog and Manjarbad, even places hundreds of 
kilometres away, were affected by uprisings. In some talooks small battles between 
disgruntled peasants and Mysore troops were fought. The insurrection spread, though it did 
not reach the same level of intensity as it did in Nagar. A majority of the Amildars 
interviewed confirmed that the ryots had gathered in kuttams in their talooks. Timmapah Raj 
Arus, Foujdar of Bangalore during the disturbances, told the writers of ‘The Report’ that the 
insurrection broke out in his district just after it had broken out in Nagar.98 The Rajah received 
a letter from Timmapah Raj where he complained that he had lost control and that the 
insurgents destroyed the crops, refused to cultivate, did not pay their taxes and plundered 
along the main roads. However, in contrast to what took place in Nagar and Chittledroog, the 
kuttams where dissolved with a small number of soldiers and the use of diplomacy, and, on a 
few occasions, with the help of Company soldiers stationed nearby. In Manjarbad Foujdari the 
situation was similar. Vera Raj Arus, the former Dewan of Mysore, claimed that the peasants 
in Chenroyapatam, a talook in Manjarbad, did not voluntarily join the kuttams, but that 
ringleaders and authoritarian persons had pressed them to do so, and that threatening letters 
from rebel leaders in Nagar and Chittledroog had encouraged them to such an extent that they 
felt compelled to rise up.99
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Letters were rapidly circulated and symbols of rebellion were sent from village to village: for 
example, leaves from the Murgosa tree, an ancient symbol of uprising. One such letter was 
written by Gopal Rao, a member of the Anegerry-family – a Maratha Brahmin family 
connected to Ram Rao since the 18th century. Gopal Rao was a dependant of Ram Rao, tied to 
him through inter-marriage. Gopal Rao cautioned the people not to return to their villages 
even if they were ordered to do so by the Rajah. He exited the ryots of Chinnagerry talook, in 
Nagar District, to rise in kuttam, which they did accordingly, on the 3rd of September.100 No 
violence happened here, and the kuttam soon ended. However, the headmen of the kuttam 
moved on to gather more support in the neighbouring talooks. In this way the uprising spread 
to Buswencottah, Shimoga, Holy-Hoonor, Anuntapoor, Terikkery, Sorub and Anawutty. In all 
these places peasants came together in huge crowds and resisted for several days the attempts 
to disperse them.  
 
The poligars and their tactics  
 
The insurrection was not a unified movement in which the participants had identical goals. It 
spread throughout the different layers of people and districts, and assumed different shapes in 
each location, although, there were clearly two main movements running parallel in the 
events. The Poligars had a distinct agenda, and more or less declared open war against the 
Government in Mysore. The ryots on the other hand had a different programme. They sought 
tax remissions, reduction of rent and justice, and they used the kuttams to deliver their 
message. These two independent movements converged on certain matters, influenced each 
other, and together strengthened their opposition against what became their mutual enemy; the 
Mysore Government. When Buda Basveppa realised that the peasants were in a disturbed 
state he was quick to fraternize with them, using his tactical skills to persuade them. He 
spread rumours that he was the acclaimed sovereign of Nuggur, showed his sunnud, styled 
himself ‘Rajah’ and told the ryots that the British supported him. Buda also intimidated the 
peasants by the use of force, pressurising them to join him. Eyewitnesses told the Committee 
that the poligars, as well as the other leaders of the rebellion, also threatened the ryots with 
expulsion from caste.101 Ramiah, an officer of Shimoga, who negotiated with the insurgents 
who had fled to Company territory in fear of punishment from Foujdar Kishen Raos troops, 
revealed to the writers of ‘The Report’ how he understood Buda’s tactics: 
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Prior to this conversation which I had with the ryots … the Nuggur Poliygar had been 
with them, giving them bad advice and telling them that the whole of the country was 
his and that they must become his allies. … The Poligar was aware of my stipulations 
into which I had entered with the ryots and he went to them subsequently and 
persuaded them not to listen … I learned that the Poligar came to the ryots in the night 
time, had conversation with them, and went off again.102   
A great number of insurgents fled to areas controlled by stationed Company troops after 
losing battles with the Mysore Government troops. A large part of the Nagar rebels believed 
that the British were on their side, or at that they would stay neutral in the conflict, and that 
the Company would not under any circumstance intervene on the Rajah’s side. This is an 
example on how the poligars successfully influenced the ryots by spreading rumours:  
He [Buda Basveppa] issued a proclamation that he had received authority from the 
Company's Government to take possession of his own country, which the Ryots so 
firmly trusted, that when Lieutenant Rochfort came, the people would not believe that 
the Company Government would assist the Rajah but that the latter had disguised a 
person of fair complexion in the dress of an European Officer and sent him there.103    
Rungappah Naik, together with his family, extended his cooperation with Buda Basveppa in 
December 1830. Rungappah Naik played a more active role in the Nagar rebellion as it 
evolved. The Committee pointed out several important aspects concerning Rungappah Naik. 
Runganappah Naik availed himself of the disaffection of the ryots towards the 
Government to improve this influence, and call it into exercise, by pressing on them 
the claims of his family, their ancient sovereigns, and reminding them of former days 
when the assessment on the land were lighter, and by promising to restore that happy 
state of affairs, if they would now publicly recognize and support his pretensions. The 
ryots generally declared in his favour and reciprocally solicited his aid to enable them 
to throw of the Mysore yoke.104
The old poligar drew upon the history of Nagar from the times before Haider Ali, back to 
Keladi Kingdom and the Nayaks. The Poligar exploited Malnad traditional resistance of 
political assimilation into greater Mysore. The Terikkery family’s participation in the 
rebellion was a full-fledged plan, which included an ideological basis with distinct goals of 
regaining power.  
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The local officers handling the rebellion 
 
From August to November 1830 the local officers had to contend with the growing 
insurrection despite limited available local recourses. It proved more difficult for the Foujdar 
and the Amildars in Nagar to put down the uprisings than for the officers in other parts of 
Mysore. 
Dispersing the gatherings of even large gatherings ... in the 1830 proved within the 
capabilities of many Amildars in the central and southern parts of the kingdom by 
deployment of their armed revenue ‘peons’ ... if this was not sufficient, the troops of 
the Mysore Durbar were used. ... However, in the upland zone of the Mysore state, 
anti-Government military formations were more powerful, and resistance was backed 
ideologically and politically such as to pose more grave problems for the Mysore 
Durbar.105
In these months the rebels in Nagar were left almost free to roam the countryside, hunt down 
Government representatives and occupy forts and towns. In this chaos the Amildars and the 
Foujdar resorted to the use of extremely harsh methods to make up for lack of guns and 
proper military equipment. Commander Syed Salar told the Committee: ‘Having no guns nor 
grain nor any means of forming a battery, we returned to Terrykerrah and wrote to the 
Hoozoor for which we were accordingly furnished.’106  
 
It is also interesting to note that the Commander of Mysore troop, Buckshee Syed Salar, was 
not able to state, before the Committee, who in fact commanded the troops. It seems as if no 
person was in charge of the operation.107 The armed forces were clearly unorganised. In 
November1830, the administration in Mysore realised that they had to disperse more soldiers 
and change their strategy towards the rebelling ryots and the Poligars. The Rajah gave orders 
to use rough methods. Later, when witnessing before the Committee, several of the officers 
said, they had strongly opposed to these orders. Foujdar of Chittledroog, Ashraff Allee Khan 
claimed that he had received instructions ‘that if any should again be guilty of any act of 
rebellion, they should be seriously punished’ and that he was told to execute rebelling ryots 
instead of mutilating them.108 At the end of December, the Amildars and the Foujdars all over 
Mysore, had spread kuttams and killed a great number of people in several violent skirmishes, 
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and this occurred more in Nagar than in any other district. At this time more than 50 people 
had been killed and more than 200 wounded in Nagar District.  
 
The Amildars faced problems of desertions as well. Around 1500 out of the 15 000 Candachar 
Peons deserted during the disturbances, something that did not surprise the Committee. The 
Candachar Peons were soldiers, or more exactly armed police, and stationed locally by the 
Hoozoor with the purpose of supporting the Amildars. One possible reason for their 
desertions was that their loyalty to Rajah was not deeply rooted in places far away from the 
state capital of Mysore. Another explanation for their desertion was arrears in payment. 
Salaries were not paid regularly in the 1820s and were often delayed up to 18 months. During 
the insurrection few of them had received the latest payment owed them. 
The Candachar Peons were the cultivators of land, and, at the same time, were 
employed in the Government service. When the insurrection broke out, the Potails and 
Ryots asked these Peons whether they were the adherents of Government or theirs, and 
the Peons being the co-habitants of the Villages of Potails and Ryots united with them 
in the revolt according to the wishes. Besides this, the wages of these Peons were due 
from the Government for the period of 10 or 18 months … which made them 
discontented, and induced them to join the rebellion.109
Only one tenth of the total number of Candachar Peons deserted and the desertions did not 
take place solely in Nagar. The arrears of payment were the same all over Mysore state and it 
can therefore be argued that the desertions were mainly caused by this. On the other hand, 
more factors must be regarded. Since Buda Basveppa and the Terikkery poligars were 
persuasive, and since the peasants to some extent acknowledged their claims to power, and 
also because the poligars for a long time looked like a winning team, it became convenient for 
the peons to switch sides in the districts where the Mysore Government was weak, for 
instance in Nagar. The witnesses confirmed that more Candachar Peons deserted in Nagar 
than compared to the rest of Mysore, the reason being, in the Committee’s own words, that 
‘there was nothing in their situation to preserve them from popular influences, and to hinder 
the contagion of sedition from spreading among them’110
 
Company soldiers were not actively used during the first months of the insurrection. Colonel 
Woulfe was stationed at Hurryhur as commander of the 24th Regiment. He witnessed the 
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insurrection spread and observed the difficulties the local officers faced. Not until the 28th of 
February 1831 was his regiment put in action. In a letter to the Committee he criticised the 
Indian officer’s way of handling the situation. 
…it never came to my knowledge that any attempts had been made to put a stop to it, 
by any other means, than those of Coercion, even in the early stages of it. As force 
was, therefore, resorted to, to crush the insurrection, it did not appear to me, that the 
measures adopted were such, as were likely to effect the intended object. No body of 
sufficient troops of sufficient strength was, as far as I was informed, assembled, until a 
considerable period after the insurrection had assembled a formidable appearance and 
some of the Poligar chiefs had possessed themselves of several strongholds.111  
He, like many others, pointed out that there was no communication between the military units, 
that the enemy was underestimated, that the units lacked proper supply lines and insufficient 
supplies of ammunition and food.   
Taking into consideration therefore, the extent of the country in which the insurrection 
prevailed, and the jungly nature of it, the number of Troops employed was totally 
inadequate, and the disposition of the different arms of which the two Detachments 
were composed, was objectionable.112
But when the Rajah’s attention was drawn to the situation, more resources were allocated. 
The Foujdar of Nagar, Veera Raj Arus, failing to end the insurrection by the forces at his 
disposal, was met with indignation from the administration in Mysore and even among his 
relatives. The displeased officers at the Hoozoor argued to remove him, so the Rajah 
complied. Kishen Rao, the nephew of Buckshee Ram Rao, was then reinstated as Foujdar of 
Nagar and troops were given to his disposal. 
 
Kishen Rao marched straight to Nagar and encountered a kuttam at Holy-Hoonor on the 16th 
November 1830, containing 2000 – 3000 ryots, many of them armed. The insurgent peasants 
who gathered here wanted the Amildar of Chinnagerry, a relative of Annagherry Gopal Rao, 
to be delivered to them. When they also unsuccessfully tried, without success, to capture the 
local fort, Kishen Rao found it necessary to disperse the crowd on the 7th of December 1830. 
Ten local ryots were killed and more than one hundred were injured.113 However, the crowds 
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were dispersed only for a short while. A few days later the ryots gathered in a larger kuttam at 
Honelly, less that 25 kilometres further north. 
… for soon it  rallied, and having been joined by ryots from almost every district in 
Nuggur, who now openly confederated with the Poligar (Rungappah Naik) against the 
Government, they formed a body, computed variously by different witnesses at from 
six or seven thousand to twenty thousand, in the vicinity of Honelly.114
Kishen Rao with a regiment from the Mysore Horse immediately attacked this huge crowd, 
injured several insurgents and captured 25.115 The prisoners were released after having their 
ears and noses cut off. These two incidents described were of such a dramatic and violent 
character that they shocked the peasants in the whole district. The rumour that Kishen Rao 
was about to slaughter all insubordinate persons spread fast all over Nagar. Thousands of 
peasants fled to nearby neighbouring territories controlled by the Company because of these 
rumours.  
 
The Resident alarmed – the Company involved 
 
The Resident got involved in November 1830. On the 22nd of November, a short time before 
the incidents in Honelly and Holy-Hoonor, the Resident sent a strong warning to Rajah 
concerning the insurrection.  
He pointed out the alarming progress of the disturbances, and the violence which the 
district officers had suffered from the ryots, adding his opinion that the ryots of 
Mysore would not have committed such excesses without cause. He observed that no 
inquiries had been made into the conduct of the public servants, who had oppressed 
the people, nor had their mal-practices received any check from the Government, and 
he concluded with urging His Highness to take some prompt steps with a view to 
remedy the growing evil. 116
The Resident initially hoped that the Rajah would be spared from travelling in person to the 
insubordinate areas, but realized soon that it might become unavoidable. On the 6th of 
November the Resident reported to the Government in Madras that he hoped the Dewan 
proved capable of solving the problems, preferably by visiting the rebellious areas himself – 
supported by military forces.  
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On the 6th of this month [November], the Resident, addressing the chief Secretary to 
Government, stated, that a spirit of insubordination had been lately manifested among 
the ryots of the Northern Talooks of Mysore, in consequence of the undecided and 
dilatory manner in which the Rajah had met their complaints, and of his continuing in 
their offices Foujdars who had rendered themselves obnoxious to the people by abuses 
and acts of oppression.117
The Resident also made it clear that British forces should be kept out of the situation as long 
as possible. However, the Rajah sought British interference, preferably in the shape of a small 
symbolic force. Consequently, the Resident expressed, in the same letter, that it was not at all 
possible to involve Company forces actively before the rebels openly showed armed 
aggression; however, in case the Dewan was unsuccessful, he agreed to support him with the 
presence of a small force for the sake of example. The Resident suggested that the Rajah 
should travel in person to the rebel districts, and that the Company would hold one regiment 
of foot soldiers and two squadrons of cavalry in readiness in Bangalore – to be used in a case 
of emergency only. The Resident wanted the Company to keep a low profile.  
 
These two letters manifested a shift in the Company policy towards the situation. The British 
patience had been tested and a likely British intervention was approaching. There was nothing 
new about the Resident criticising the Rajah, but he was now for the first time engaged 
personally in the rebellion. And he was clear spoken when he criticised the Rajah for not 
giving the matter more attention. However, the Rajah had taken measures to calm the 
rebellion. In letters dated the 10th of November and the 21st of November, he ordered the 
Foujdars of Bangalore, Chittledroog and Nagar, to find and hang rebels that withheld rent or 
rebelled against the Amildars. He had also removed Vera Raj Arus from his position and 
reinstated Kishen Rao as Foujdar of Nagar. These measures proved not to be sufficient and in 
December the Rajah sent reinforcements to both Nagar and Bangalore district, and decided to 
travel himself to the disturbed areas. 
 
The Resident and the Rajah to Manjarbad 
 
The disturbances in Manjarbad Foujdari started just a few weeks after the first uprisings in 
Nagar. Large kuttams gathered in Chenroyapatam and in most of the nearby talooks in the 
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district. The Rajah decided to quell the rebellion here first, mainly due to the fact that it was 
much closer to Mysore than Nagar. The Resident left Mysore before the Rajah and travelled 
ahead to the nearest troubled areas in the Manjarbad Foujdari. Upon arriving he recommended 
that the peasants be patient and wait for the king to come to hear their complaints. He ensured 
them that all their claims would be enquired into by the Government and that all allegations 
against the Amildars would be investigated properly. Subsequently he attempted to 
discourage the peasants from having too high hopes of receiving reductions in the rent or any 
other financial remittances. 
 
On the 16th of December Dewan Venkataj Raj Arus sent a letter to the distressed ryots in 
Yeggetty talook and informed them that the Rajah was coming to Chenroyapatam in person. 
He encouraged them to come forward to present their complaints. At the same time he 
promised that measures would be taken to prevent further suffering and oppression.118 On the 
way to Chenroyapatam the Rajah made some stopovers in troubled districts. In these districts, 
the Rajah punished and fired a few district officers, and immediately installed new officers. 
He then distributed presents to the principal potails and betel nuts to the peasants, and 
dismissed them to their villages. The Rajah refused to make immediate changes in the revenue 
system, arguing that it was long established.119 The Rajah, accompanied by family, reached 
Chenroyapatam on the 18th of December 1830, and encountered a kuttam containing several 
thousand people, mainly ryots and potails. The dissidents were asked to break up the 
gathering and return to their respective villages. They refused to go home and ‘an increased 
insubordination and disrespect to the Rajah was manifested by these ryots on the following 
day.’120 Instead of delivering their complaints or disperse the crowd, the ryots stuck together, 
played on their flutes and drums and showed ’... acts indicative of gross disrespect to their 
sovereign, if not of open defiance of his authority.’121  
 
The Rajah ordered the drums and flutes confiscated and the leaders to be arrested. The 
instruments were considered to be traditional symbols of rebellion. Then he sent officers who 
were escorted by troops to enquire into the complaints of the ryots and to punish whoever 
they thought deserved it. Little loyalty was shown towards the Rajah, and the insurgents 
clearly did not trust the officers, which was the main reasons for the ryots not coming 
                                                 
118 ‘Report on’, p. 31 
119 ‘Report on’, p. 33 
120 ‘Report on’, p. 34 
121 ‘Report on’, p. 34 
 51
forward. The presence of a large body of troops in the Rajah’s camp also could have 
frightened the peasants and prevented them from coming forward with their complaints. 
Another possible reason for this reluctance could be that they had been so frequently 
disappointed that they did not trust the administration’s capacity to improve their situation.122 
Possibly the rumours of the violence that had met the ryots at Holy-Hoonor had reached them 
and they feared the same treatment. The kuttam at Chenroyapatam was finally dispersed with 
the use of violence. Five of the dissident ryots were executed on the spot, presumably picked 
out by Chowdiah, the Residents Sheristardar, and many more flogged. There are no available 
records on the exact number of punishments. The Rajah returned to Mysore when the 
disturbances in Manjarbad had ended.  
 
The still distressed peasants in Nagar had hoped that the Rajah would come to the district to 
investigate the situation, subsequent to his visit in Manjarbad, but he did not. When the Rajah 
returned to Mysore from Chenroyapatam so soon after settling the matters there, the people 
generally believed it was the Foujdar Kishen Rao and his unpopular allies who had influenced 
him to go home. A local officer at Shimoga stated to the Committee that most of the people 
alleged that it was the Rajah’s advisors, closely related to Kishen Rao, who had discouraged 
the Rajah from coming to Nagar because they were afraid their crimes and corrupt ways could 
be exposed if he went there.123
 
Dewan Venkataj Raj Arus, Annapah and Lieutenant Rochfort 
 
In December 1830 Rungappah Naik, the poligar of Terikkery, and his nephew openly attacked 
the forts at Culdroog and Camundroog, in the eastern part of Nagar. Both forts were seized by 
the insurgents. Dewan Venkataj Arus was ordered to take back these forts with a strong force 
and on the 5th of January 1831 he went to Chittledroog and Nagar Foujdaris in command of a 
strong military force, including cavalry and infantry, with the purpose of trying to end the 
insurrection permanently. 
 
About the same time, early in January, Kishen Rao was removed as Foujdar, and Annapah, an 
officer in the Mysore Horse, replaced him. The official reason for the replacement was Kishen 
Raos inability to end the insurrection in Nagar. Annapah obtained an extended mandate to 
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deploy his forces more actively and to be stern. In the last weeks of 1830 and the first months 
of 1831 the insurgents in had Nagar become well organised and more people had openly 
joined them. Buda Basveppa recruited armed mercenaries from southern Maharatta country 
who strongly resisted both the Dewan and Annapah, during what at this point in time could be 
called a civil war in Nagar. 
 
The fighting between Annapah and the rebels lasted nearly two months. He was driven to 
retreat into the fort at Anuntapoor. There he was besieged for six weeks until he and his men 
were forced to retreat one more time and seek friendly territory. The explanation for 
Annapah’s military failure to hold the fort lies in the dividing of his forces prior to the battle. 
Annapah had given away personnel to Dewan Vencata Raj Arus, who were on his way to 
recapture the forts in Culdroog and Camundroog.124 When the rebels realised their 
advantageous situation they were inspired to fight fiercely. The rebels outnumbered the 
soldiers to such an extent that they were able to block all the roads leading to Anuntapoor, 
effectively cutting of supplies and killing all officials trying to get through. However, 
Annapah and his men managed to break out to seek safe refuge. They made their way to 
Masoor district in Company territory, 24 kilometres away. A large number of soldiers were 
killed in the escape.125 Afterwards Annapah was ordered to join the Dewan and the newly 
arrived Company officer, Lieutenant Rochfort. 
  
Camundroog and Culdroog forts were both retaken after much difficulty. The rebels at 
Culdroog were conquered at first attempt, but the siege of Camundroog fort failed at first 
attempt in February 1831. At this point the Company started actively to assist the native 
soldiers. Lieutenant Rochfort, the military commander in the Residents escort, acted as 
advisor for the Mysore troops when they finally to re-conquered Camundroog fort on the 3rd 
of March 1831. Fifty rebels and 23 soldiers were killed in the battle.  
 
Honelly  
 
The most controversial incident during the insurrection was the execution of 99 persons, 
subsequent to the second battle of Honelly. All the prominent characters involved – Foujdar 
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Annapah, Commander Syed Salar, Lieutenant Rochfort and the Dewan Vencata Raj Arus – 
were present. 
 
After the battle of Camundroog, Lieutenant Rochfort and the Dewan marched to Shimoga and 
joined forces with Annapah and Syed Salar. They all proceeded to Honelly, where 
intelligence reports had revealed large kuttams. In Honelly they found the fort and the temple 
occupied by rebels. After short and unsuccessful negotiations Lieutenant Rochfort and 
Vencata Raj Arus decided to storm the fortifications on the 12th of March 1831. They took 
180 of the rebels. Out of these, 99 persons were later hanged in Honelly and on the road 
towards Shirkarpoor. The commander of Infantry Syed Salar wrote a report to the Dewan 
concerning these hangings, in which he blamed Lieutenant Rochfort for ordering the 
executions. However, in Annapah’s report, presumably sent to the Rajah, there is no mention 
of Rochfort’s participation in these decisions. Instead he claimed that the Dewan himself 
ordered the prisoners hanged. In this case, all the persons involved told different stories to the 
Committee when interviewed. The Dewan denied later that he had given any orders for the 
executions. He tried to put the blame solely upon Annapah and referred to a letter he had sent 
to the Rajah where he described the incident. The Committee asked to see this letter but 
neither the original nor the copy could be found. The Rajah claimed never to have received 
such letter. He said that he had requested more information about the hangings himself. He 
had written to Annapah and asked to be consulted before decisions were made about the 
captured rebels. The Committee doubted that any such letters had been written. Syed Salar 
later said, in interviews, that he had forgotten to mention Rochfort’s name concerning the 
hangings. Lieutenant Rochfort himself emphasised that he only acted according to the will of 
the Resident and that the prisoners were handed over to native authority, thus he could not 
know what happened to them, and did not inquire. Rochfort also emphasised that he did not 
have any authority to judge or punish anyone. The Committee wrote in ‘The report’ that it 
was evident that the Dewan gave the orders. They criticised the Rajah for the hangings and 
would not excuse him even when he denied any connection to the incidents. Everybody 
blamed each other: and it seems clear that when there was a British officer present, the native 
Mysore officers felt he was in charge, even without a given mandate to be in command, and 
they could use him as an excuse for their own actions. 
 
Company operations 
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Lieutenant Rochfort reached the town of Nagar on the 26th of March 1831, and captured it 
without fighting. The rebels had left the night before, leaving the dead bodies of more than 20 
persons, mostly local Brahmins and civil servants. Chendergooty fort, located in the 
northernmost part of Nagar was taken on the 6th of April 1831, also without much resistance. 
Then Lieutenant Rochfort placed his soldiers at strategic locations to secure against further 
uprising. The Resident optimistically reported on the 4th of April 1831 that the people now 
would cooperate if they received proper protection. In response to this the Company sent the 
24th regiment from Bangalore to Shimoga, to be stationed there for a while. The commander 
of the regiment, Colonel Woulfe, patrolled the countryside to calm the ryots and to 
demonstrate British presence. In mid-April the 24th regiment received intelligence about a 
large foreign cavalry force moving into Mysore from southern Maharatta to aid Buda 
Basveppa. Annapah together with Colonel Woulfe moved out and arrested a few men and sent 
the rest of them home. Woulfe praised Rochfort’s military efforts and stated that Company 
soldiers were superior to the insurgent troops in all ways. Woulfe estimated Rochfort’s forces 
to be in total 700 soldiers of horse and foot: ‘With this small Force he had to march through a 
hostile country, attacked the Fort at Bednur [Nagar], leaved [sic] a garrison there after taking 
it, and then returned to the north, to attack the high Hill Fort of Chenderghobtlydroog 
[Chendergooty]’126
 
The Rajah, at the same time, became desperate to show the Company his good will and to 
demonstrate that he was ready to improve his governance. Dewan Vencata Arus was fired in 
April 1831 and replaced with Balojee Rao, another relative of the Buckshee Ram Rao. The 
Resident wrote in a letter on the 19th of April 1831, that Dewan Venkataj Arus had been 
called to the Hoozoor in shame and replaced by a better qualified officer, and that the Rajah 
was aware of the dangers facing him. The Rajah stated that ‘... if it should come to my 
knowledge that he [Balojee Rao] shows partiality, the necessary steps shall be taken’.127
 
During March and April, the insurgents had become more hostile towards the Company 
soldiers and openly fired guns, not only against the Mysore state troops, but also at regular 
Company troops. Tranquillity had been restored elsewhere in Mysore, including Chittledroog, 
but in Nagar Foujdari the insurgents continued to increase their strength. Colonel C. B Evans 
who at this point in time operated in Nagar together with the 15th regiment was forced to 
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retreat from Futtehpet where he had tried to capture a fortified barrier in the jungle. During 
their retreat, the insurgents had attacked, killed and wounded several men and carried off 
Company equipment. 
 
Therefore the Company still considered the situation to be tense with high danger of 
prolonged rebellion. The Resident wished to end the rebellion completely before the monsoon 
set in, regardless of cost. J. A. Casamaijor, the Resident, wrote to the Chief Secretary to 
Government, Fort St. George, dated the 29th of April 1831: ‘... I am now impressed with the 
necessity as well as policy of calling for the immediate and full aid of the Subsidiary force of 
Mysoor [Mysore] to quell this Rebellion premises to the prevalence of the South-west 
monsoon ...’128 The Company therefore reinforced their troops with infantry, cavalry and 
canons, concentrating the forces in Shimoga.129 The Resident and the new Dewan left for 
Nagar around the middle of May. On the 30th of May, the Resident wrote to Madras 
authorities that peace and stability had been reinforced in Nagar District and that the forces 
stationed in Shimoga and around the Nagar countryside probably could return before the 
Monsoon. The south west monsoon in South India begins in late May, and continues until 
August. However, already the next day the Resident and the Dewan had to move out to re-
capture the town of Nagar which had fallen into the hands of the insurgents for the third time. 
The rebels had also constructed roadblocks between Anuntapoor and Futtehpet, along the 
main road from Shimoga to Nagar. However, most of the resistance was sporadic and the 
barricades were usually evacuated when the Resident arrived at them. He constantly sent 
messages to the peasants and invited them to meet him and discuss their views upon the 
matters in dispute. The insurrection slowly ebbed out and neither the British nor the Mysore 
troops were met with much armed or organised resistance in the beginning of June. In one 
incident two of the Resident’s messengers were killed and the two presumed perpetrators 
were later hanged in Nagar by the order of the Dewan.  
 
Ending of the rebellion 
 
A letter from the Resident, on the 12th of June 1831 marked the final conquering of Nagar, and 
the acceptance of terms of peace by the majority of the insurgents. The Resident also 
emphasized that some of the peasants still expressed disobedience and anger towards the 
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Government. However, from now on only sporadic skirmishes and small kuttams faced the 
soldiers in Nagar. The leaders of the rebellion, the poligars, were still active and led a small 
opposition, and Buda Basveppa tried to get rally for more support, but these leaders no longer 
represented a serious threat to the state of Mysore. Rumours in 1832, told that Buda Basveppa 
had fled to the state of Hyderabad and that Rungappah Naik was killed. 
 
The Resident continued his work of investigation and together with the Dewan he spent 
almost a month enquiring into the alleged abuse and oppression related to revenue collection. 
He wrote to Madras, on the 6th of July 1831, that injustice had been discovered and rooted out, 
and that this had ’... been gratefully received by the maganies [village officers] … of Nuggur 
and Anuntapoor, and the ryots have in my presence expressed their cheerful acquiescence in 
the changes that have been made in their favour.’130 The Committee also concluded when they 
wrote ‘The Report’ in June 1833, that ‘… the insurrection, understanding by that term the 
revolt which had taken place, of a large part of the population of the Mysore country, was at 
an end.’131  
 
Loss of life and property  
 
The exact numbers of loss of life on both sides are not documented. According to the Dewan, 
164 persons from the rebel side were executed during the insurrection in the whole of 
Mysore.132 The Committee’s own figure, based on testimonials and other written sources, is 
close to 240.133 The number of rebels killed in action differs also between the sources. 
Regimentardar Sreenevas Rao claimed that between 500 and 600 persons died in action134. 
However, Annapah alone claimed he had killed more than 700 insurgents.135 We can only 
know that many more insurgents than Company and Mysore soldiers were killed, even if we 
do not have the exact numbers. Quite a large number of civilians were killed by the rebels; 
there are a lot of examples that suggest this – for instance the 20 Brahmins and civil servants 
killed in Nagar. 
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It is impossible to give an accurate account of material losses: The Company requested from 
the Rajah a report concerning lost property and wreckage, but the report never came. 
However the Committee pointed out in ‘The report’ the negative impact on trade and 
cultivation of land, and that it would take time to restore the prosperity of Mysore. ‘We find 
ourselves unable to speak, except in very general terms, of the extent to which the 
insurrection, besides causing the immediate loses of lives and property which have been 
adverted to, has affected the prosperity of the country.’136
 
Violence during the rebellion 
 
Mullaganee, a ryot of Hurrungutty in Shimoga talook told the Committee of cases of 
mutilation inflicted on the rebels during the disturbances.137 He stated that the ryots had ‘... 
assembled together for the purpose of representing our joys and griefs to our superiors.’ 
However, they were surrounded, beaten and mutilated while trying to negotiate with Kishen 
Rao outside of Shimoga. Other peasants had similar stories and described before the 
Committee how the Amildars and the Foujdar had beaten, flogged and mutilated them and 
their friends. The peasants had also heard stories of friends that had been beaten and killed in 
Holy-Hoonor. Some witnesses stated that the rebels acted aggressively and openly harassed 
and maltreated the officers. Sowcar Soorlee Sobiah claimed that the rebels plundered his 
house during the rebellion.138 Other witnesses stated that several officers were kidnapped and 
forced to join the kuttams. 
 
As mentioned before the officers were ordered to use rough methods and punishment. Ram 
Naik, Goreekar of the Bangalore cutcherree, is one amongst many who claimed to have 
received orders to use harsher methods against the rebels.139 Kishen Rao marked the ryots by 
scarring them, a widespread strategy used to separate friend from foe. Corporal punishment 
was a traditional method of punishment in India in the early colonial era and the military in 
particular made use of these methods to mark their opponents and presumably stigmatise 
them. The Committee tried in ‘The Report’ to defend the use of corporal punishment and 
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called it something that ‘… by no means amounted to what could with correctness and 
language be called mutilation ….”140
 
When the Resident received information that during course of the rebellion the local officers 
condoned mutilation by scarring he reacted negatively and demanded that the Rajah abolished 
this form of penalty in the districts and reminded the Rajah that the Company did not condone 
this form of corporal punishment. The Resident got the impression that the Rajah actually 
ordered the district officers to end the use of mutilation: however, as mentioned before, the 
Rajah ordered at the same time the local officers to be harsher against the rebels and to 
execute leaders of the uprisings, or ’whom they might apprehend and consider deserving of 
death. … Those who are deserving of death should be hanged immediately’.141 According to 
the Resident, in a letter written to the Committee on the 17th of April 1833, these orders were 
given to the military officers without the Resident’s knowing. This may be a method for the 
Resident to excuse and defend himself against the allegations from the Indian officers. 
However, the Resident was never asked about these matters again.  
 
Much violence occurred on both sides of the conflict during the rebellion. The tension had 
been built up for a long time before the insurrection broke out and the conflict – close to a 
civil war – lasted as long as almost a year. The violence took place on all levels and was 
performed by all the participants.  
 
Conclusion of the insurrection 
 
When the insurrection had ended, the focus came on the causes of the rebellion. The 
Company registered that the peasants had put forward numerous complaints against the 
Amildars and the Resident requested that these were investigated, and if possible, that the 
Rajah should settle the disagreements and remove the causes of displeasure and unrest 
permanently. The Rajah promised to act according to the will of the Company. He had at this 
stage realised that the British were serious when they threatened to take control of the state of 
Mysore, possibilities which were ratified in the treaty of 1799. 
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The rebellion seems to have been a popular uprising. The military capacity of the local 
administrators was weak at first, and then the Rajah’s attention was drawn to the crisis, more 
resources allocated and the Company assisted the Mysore troops in the final operations of 
quelling the rebellion. There were also elements of corruption and violence performed by the 
officers, especially in Nagar. In addition, there are other players in this story as well, located 
and acting in Nagar. The Terikkery Poligars, and Buda Basveppa, the ‘great impostor’, were 
skilled in propaganda and played on the feelings of a Malnad people starved of recognition 
and rice. History became politicised and romanticised, and old symbols of Keladi were 
brought back as tools in a short, but violent, clash against the central powers of Mysore. These 
are the important aspects of the Nagar rebellion. The mobilisation of so many have people 
could not have been possible without all of these factors. To discuss the causes of the Nagar 
rebellion, and why we can label the insurrection with that name, I will identify the 
insurrection as a local affair that spread by the word, through both letters and by mouth, and 
symbols from Nagar District by the people and the  to other parts of Mysore. 
 
A local affair 
 
Before we can talk of a Nagar-rebellion, we must identify the incidents that originated in 
Nagar, geographically and in time, and investigate how the insurrection then spread to the rest 
of Mysore. My hypothesis is that the disturbances in Mysore originally were a local affair that 
started in Nagar and subsequently spread to the whole country. Circumstantial evidence points 
towards this.  
 
First of all the fighting was tougher, and the resistance harder in Nagar than in the rest of 
Mysore. The town of Nagar itself was conquered by the rebels three times. And the area 
between the towns of Shimoga and Nagar was constantly barricaded. In the jungle areas 
between Nagar and Shimoga, near Futtehpet, the rebels reorganised and gathered strength 
repeatedly for almost a year. Their base of power lied in these tracts. We also have to regard 
the fact that the largest battles between the insurgents and the Mysore soldiers supported by 
British advisors, took place in Nagar Foujdari, especially near Shimoga. 
 
There are other circumstances that point to the rebellion springing out of Nagar. Officers from 
other districts, including a few of the peasants and headmen, when interviewed by the 
Committee, stated to the Committee that the disturbances in their Foujdaris were only inspired 
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by the insurgents in Nagar and Chittledroog. Timmapah Raj Arus, Foujdar of Bangalore in 
1830, told the Committee that disturbances started in his district just subsequent to the 
circulating of letters from Nagar and Chittledroog among the ryots in the villages in his 
Foujdari. These letters carried messages and symbols encouraging everybody to join the 
uprisings. The leaf of the Murgosa tree was the emblem of insurrection, a conventional way of 
sending the signal of mobilisation among the peasants in India: ‘The ryots had assembled in 
cootum in the Nuggur territory and the Nuggur Poligar having joined them. Circular letters … 
came sometimes two, three and four one day, and bones tied round with leaves of the 
Murgosa tree … were sent to all the talooks.’142
 
The Foujdar of Bangalore, Timmapah Raj Arus, claimed that the insurrection had aims of 
change exclusively in the districts of Nagar and Chittledroog. He never registered any cases of 
oppression in his own district, or at least he did not hear of any complaints.143 In the 
interviews with the Committee he faced representatives of his new employers, representatives 
of the Company in the Committee, and he would not likely have stated otherwise. However, 
an interesting point he made was that the ryots in his talooks rose in kuttams after the ryots of 
Nagar and Chittledroog had done so. Vencata Kistniah, Foujdar of Manjarbad, added to this 
impression. He stated to the Committee that the disturbances in Manjarbad was instigated by 
the poligars in Nagar, and that the ryots that rebelled in the talook of Krishnarajakutty did this 
only because they were induced to do so from the example set by those of the other districts. 
He even called it a ‘conspiracy’.144 The rebellion sprung out of one place and spread all over 
the country.  
 
The insurrection in Mysore was in many ways a typical Indian incident. According to Guha, 
revolts were common in India in the colonial period, with 110 known uprisings registered in 
the period 1783 – 1900.145 The early 19th century was an unstable period in Mysore. The state 
of Mysore had been the scene of uprisings prior to the Nagar rebellion.146 Uprisings occurred 
frequently and therefore the uniqueness of the 1830 insurrection might be questioned. 
However, the events still may seem exceptional in the way they spread rapidly almost all over 
Mysore. On the other side, the communicable effects of uprisings were just as common. 
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Usually the first signs of insurrection began in a village, or in a panchayat, and spread rapidly 
to other districts. There existed common symbols of rebellion which also points to the fact 
that the population knew the codex and how to react to it.147 To me this leads, together with 
the statements from the witnesses, to the conclusion that the insurrection in Mysore was 
instigated in Nagar District and that it spread to other districts only due to pressure from 
Nagar – both from the peasants and the poligars. It was mainly a local affair, and the main 
causes of the insurrection will therefore lie in Nagar, in a combination with other causes, 
common for the whole of Mysore state. Misfortune, ambitious adventurers, oppression, 
Maratha influence, economic crises, tradition and misadministration – all combined together 
these factors caused an extraordinary situation. In the next chapter I will describe what seem 
to be the different causes of the Nagar rebellion. 
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6. The causes to the Nagar rebellion 
 
 
The Committee felt, in retrospective, that the insurrection was bound to happen because of the 
misconduct that took place in the administration: ‘When public affairs were conducted in this 
manner, it is not to be wondered at that great discontent with the Government should have 
arisen among the people.’148
 
This chapter starts by excluding the Company as a cause of the rebellion. Then I describe the 
general circumstances in the Mysore state, concerning economy and the revenue system, and 
how this environment contributed to the peasant’s general feeling of living under bad 
conditions and of being submitted to an oppressive revenue policy and unjust administration. 
Finally I will focus on the administration in Nagar and how the administrators are related to 
the rebellion. 
 
The Kingdom of Mysore was an independent state in 1830, partly controlled by the partition 
treaty of 1799 and instructed to keep an army for British disposal. It was annually taxed and 
the ruler was obliged to seek advice from the Resident. The Company did not attempt to 
control local affairs in Mysore. The long arm of the Company did not reach through the layers 
of the Nagar administration. The British presence at the Hoozoor and the Durbar was vague 
and did not influence upon the situation in Nagar District or upon the economy and 
administration at any level in Mysore. Evidence does not exist to suggest that insurrection was 
aimed directly against the British.  
 
The British intervened in Mysore, subsequently to insurrection broke out and more than half a 
year after the Buda Basveppa’s wedding – where he proclaimed himself as ‘Rajah of Nagar’. 
The Company had reduced the number of troops stationed in Mysore since the first years of 
occupation subsequent to the defeat of Tipu Sultan. In Nagar District the Company was only 
one of the parties in the situation before they intervened; they were notable by their absence 
of action. It appears that the people in Nagar did not expect the Company to aid the Rajah in a 
crisis. The awareness of their absence and supposed neutrality gave the rebels a feeling of 
safety that accelerated the extensiveness and intensity of the rebellion: ‘[A]nd there can be no 
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doubt that it has afforded a facility to the instigators of the disturbances in leading the people 
to believe that the Company’s Government would not support the authority of the Rajah.’149
 
The general causes of peasant dissatisfaction 
 
During the 20 years that passed from the Rajah’s assumption of power in 1811 to the outbreak 
of the rebellion, the economy of Mysore declined to such an extent that a general feeling of 
despair prevailed in Mysore. Vencata Kistniah, Foujdar of Manjarbad, was one of many 
persons interviewed that pointed out to the Committee the many factors contributing to both 
diminution of revenue and decline of general standards of living: the falling prices of corn, 
failure of crops, absence of rain and lack of able Amildars. A decline in the economy in the 
whole of South India in the 1820’s struck hard in many areas.150  
… [A] general phenomenon of depression in prices and economic activity in most 
part‘s of northern, western and southern India from the middle of the 1820s down to 
the beginning of the 1850s. Almost certainly this led, in many cases, to a contraction 
of the sphere of circulation of money.151  
The revenue income of Mysore dropped from 27 lakhs pagoda in the last year of Purnaiya’s 
reign to 24 lakhs in 1828/29 and finally to 23 lakhs152 in 1830. David Ludden points to the 
agrarian crises in this period, with decreased demand on the farmers’ products leading to 
falling prices, together with crop shortfalls.153 In parts of South India famines occurred: ‘Bad 
seasons hit them very hard … Famine and epidemics destroyed crops and families during two 
wretched years, 1831 and 1833, especially in the southern mixed zones.’154
 
Maintenance of dams and tanks, which was the Amildars responsibility, was neglected. When 
asked specifically, all the witnesses stated to the Committee that the waterways and water 
storage facilities – necessary to uphold production levels from irrigated agriculture – were not 
sufficiently maintained during the 1820’s. The impact this had on the production was 
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devastating. David Ludden among others emphasise the importance of maintaining control of 
water for stable agricultural production.155
 
The state of Mysore was an important area for metal production in India, and in the period 
before 1830 the country experienced falling prices on metal export. Burton Stein claims that 
the downward economical trend in the Mysore state was caused by a restructuring of Indian 
exports in general and Indian gold trade in special, which led to increased tax pressure and 
lowered income for the farmers.156 This again resulted in reduced demand on other products 
and thus the economical depression was accelerated.  
 
Another factor contributing to the economical recession was the reduced demand on goods 
from military forces. In a war-faring nation or in a state with a large standing army the 
demand will be artificially kept at a high level and farmers and craftsmen will be able to earn 
well. The state of Mysore prior to 1799 made good profits on war and plundering, which in 
turn spread positive synergy effects, boosting local business and increasing cultivation of 
land. As ‘The Committee’s Report’ states:   
…[B]efore the conquest, Mysore was the seat of a completely independent 
Government, which, not to speak of the vast quantities of plunder its troops brought in, 
gave by its expenditure profitable employment to vast numbers of the people, … in 
meeting its demands for stores of every kind, and all the materials of war, and which 
in this and other ways afforded considerable encouragements to manufacturers.157
After the fall of the Muslim Sultans, the British forces stationed in Mysore upheld the same 
effect for some years. However, the gradual reduction in the number of British forces placed 
in Mysore, the lack of payment to the soldiers and general reduction of Mysore troops 
reduced the demand on food and other goods. In times of peace less money circulated in 
Mysore and the country went into an economic recession. In 1824, when the standing British 
army in Madras was sent to Burma, demand for food, oxen for transport and civil use 
decreased, which further increased the economic depression. This combined with epidemics 
and less monsoon rain spelled bad times for the Mysore economy.158  
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Some of the interviewed officers mentioned cholera to the Committee. They claimed that the 
disease reduced the population dramatically, laid land waste, reduced cultivation and reduced 
demand on goods, thus having a negative impact upon the economy. However, there are 
reasons to be sceptical to whether cholera had any effect on the overall situation at all. Only 
the Mysore state officers told the Committee about the epidemic and only when they were 
asked what the causes for the rebellion were. It may have been used as an excuse to shift the 
focus away from improper administration. None of the peasants interviewed mentioned the 
cholera. They should have been aware of the impact of the cholera since they would be 
exposed to this deadly disease. Moreover, no other sources mention cholera. Census figures 
are not accurate since no exact numbers exist before 1841, when the first official census was 
taken, but one estimate shows that the population increased from 1.9 million in 1801 to 3.5 
million in 1832.159 The writers of ‘The Report’ doubted that there had been a decrease in 
population in Mysore. Nostalgia and ignorance were the explanations to why people thought 
that things were better in the old days, they claim: 
Besides particular biases which may probably have influenced their evidence, it was 
liable to be swayed by that general prejudice, natural to all mankind, which tends to 
make men believe that the world degenerates and decays as themselves grow old, and 
which requires for its counteraction a greater enlightenment of mind than those 
persons could be expected to possess.160
I have in the earlier chapters described the revenue system in Mysore, and the impact the 
shurtee-system had on the society. The system was observed by contemporary actors as unjust 
and the Amildars were described as oppressive and greedy. The general impression among the 
ryots and some of the officers interviewed was that the depressive conditions caused by the 
system drove the peasants and potails to rebel. The people of Mysore had a tougher time in 
the 1820’s. Especially in Nagar the peasants were dissatisfied because the shurtee combined 
with the distinct shist was felt as unreasonable compared to the earlier traditional tax systems 
of the area. Ramiah, a local officer at Shimoga, serving during the disturbances, met the 
rebelling ryots and listened to their complaints. Statements like this summoned up the general 
feeling amongst them:  
We are become insolvent. Moreover, for four or five years they have assessed us for 
our waste lands. They also exact more than is due for impost duties. The Amildars and 
others force from us unpaid labour. Though we have made these and similar 
                                                 
159 B. Lewis Rice, Mysore, p. 218 
160 ‘Report on’, p. 68 
 66
complaints at the Foujdar’s Cutcherree, and at the Dewan’s Cutcherree yet they are not 
inquired into. Though we addressed to Government on these subjects our letter are 
never received. …seeing ourselves this situated, and having no other resources left to 
us, we were driven to rebellion.161
The writers of ‘The Report’ were given the mandate to investigate the causes and 
consequences of the disturbances. They interviewed a large number of the participants and 
read all relevant documents – hence the conclusion of ‘The Report’ cannot be overlooked. 
The Committee argued that the fact that the ryots gathered in kuttams to protest against 
oppression did not prove that the Amildars acted unreasonably or oppressive. The Committee 
was aware of the claims that the people of Mysore were less fortunate in 1830 due to 
unfavourable circumstances and alleged oppression; although it doubted that this alone was 
the general cause of the rebellion. The Committee compared the situation in Mysore with an 
example from the district of Canara, where an uprising took place just prior to the Mysore 
insurrection.162 In Canara the peasants stated grave complaints and accused the authorities of 
being far more oppressive than the ryots in Mysore and Nagar in 1830 claimed that the 
Mysore authorities were. The Committee also point to the fact that there were grim examples 
of exploitation and misadministration in many provinces in the Madras Presidency where the 
people did not rebel. The tax-levels were not higher in Mysore compared to other Native 
States in South India and the ryots did not complain more often in the 1820’s than they did 
before.  
It is worthy of remark that in some of the complaints of the people, of the grievances 
they have been subjected to under the Rajah’s Government, the period of Poorniah’s 
administration is included in the general census, without distinction from that of the 
Rajah’s personal rule.163
The Committee concluded that the tax pressure and the increased rents in Mysore were not the 
causes of uprising. The insurrection was more caused by the Rajah and his way of ruling, the 
Committee claimed. ‘The fault of his character and his Government were of a different 
kind.’164 The Committee felt that the system itself was the cause of increased corruption and 
that it laid the road open for faulty characters to exploit people, especially in the province of 
Nagar, and not particularly through increased taxes. 
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The great faults of the Rajah’s Government ... was throughout venal and corrupt; that 
no efficient control was exercised over the district officers; that the people were vexed 
and fretted by the unjust and arbitrary acts of those officers and could obtain no 
redress; that there was no security for property, and nothing that was fit to be called 
the administration of justice. These evils seem to have been felt more than any where 
else in the province of Nuggur…165
As mentioned in the introduction we should take a nuanced approach when we interpret the 
Committee’s conclusions to the causes to the Nagar Rebellion. Their view can be seen as a 
tool for the Company to justify their inclusion of Mysore into the British Empire. The 
members of the Committee, that were put were put down a few months subsequent to the end 
of the insurrection, were appointed by the Governor-General in Council, Sir William 
Bentinck. At that time, the Company administered, or ruled Mysore state directly, and was in 
need for political justification for occupancy. It seems that when constantly referring to the 
faults of the Rajah the Committee legitimise the Company take over of Mysore. The 
Company maybe also wanted to make due for its reserved approach towards Mysore in the 
1820’s. Stephen R. Lushington, Munro’s successor as Governor of Madras (1827 – 32) also 
added to this impression when he criticised Munro for what he called an indulgence of a client 
state. 
 
However, ‘The Report’ emphasised other factors outside Rajah’s control: reduced income, 
economic recession and reduced prices on crops, and the Committee admitted; ‘We have no 
doubt that the people of Mysore are generally in far less easy circumstances than they were 
thirty years ago.’166 This was attributed to the general recession which the Committee thought 
struck Mysore worse than other parts of South India. Burton Stein thinks that this 
combination, including bad crop seasons and increased tax pressure, was one of the main 
causes of the Nagar rebellion and the insurrection in other districts: ‘A principal cause of the 
Nagar uprising and its rapid spread to other parts of the Mysore state quite distant from Nagar 
was the pressure for increased revenue at a time of bad crop season and falling prices.’167 
This, combined with the Rajahs lack of control, made the rebellion an irreversible process 
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steered by uncontrollable factors like the Terikkery family, Buda Basveppa and militant 
outsiders.168  
 
Nagar poligars: Ideology and history 
 
I have shown that the insurrection started in Nagar, that the special qualities of the Malnad 
were contributing factors, and that forces outside the Rajahs control instigated the uprisings in 
a limited geographical area – Nagar District. There were more factors connected to Nagar, 
that made segments of the population in that district susceptible for opposition. The answer 
lies with the District poligars.  
 
The Nagar poligars were the major instigating force and main drive behind the rebellion. The 
peasants rose in kuttams at an early stage of the rebellion. As the rebellion commenced Buda 
Basveppa and Rungappah Naik threatened and encouraged peasants to continue the uprising 
and used them as pile drivers for their ambitions. However, witnesses also stated to the 
Committee that the poligars were supported by the ryots, and that they were not forced 
through threats to rise in kuttam. Chender Rao, regimentardar in the Mysore Sillidar Horse, 
claimed that the poligars had much support: ‘The cause of this was that they were unable to 
bear the oppressions of the Amildars and sheristadars, and being able to obtain no redress 
from the Government. For these reasons they abetted the Poligars.’169
 
Chender Rao and other witnesses claimed that the poligars instigated the rebellion, and that 
the peasants soon followed their example. The Committee definitely held the poligars to be 
one of the most important factors responsible for the turn the rebellion took. However, Ranajit 
Guha’s theories of peasant insurgencies suggest that the peasants in general were not passive 
and weak-willed puppets of someone else’s higher ambition. He maintains that all Indian 
rebellions at the period were planned – furthermore that none were spontaneous: ‘Insurgency, 
in other words, was a motivated and conscious undertaking on the part of the rural masses.’170 
The nature of the rebellions was not comparable to natural disasters – not unexpectedly 
breaking out. This supports the conclusion that both these processes – the peasant’s 
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movement and the poligars planned rebellion – grew parallel to each other and found mutual 
support in each other. 
 
In the Nagar rebellion an ideology based upon history became crystallised and used by the 
leaders. The poligars made use of the old symbols supported by their propaganda. Buda used 
the language of power, styled himself Rajah, called upon tradition, envisaged the golden past, 
evoked history and created legitimacy for himself and his claimed inheritance. The mass 
movement of the fall of 1830 and in the beginning of 1831 could not have not have happened 
without this ideology. According to the Committee, the enthusiasm of the masses would have 
ebbed out much earlier.171 Burton Stein writes: ‘This history was called into support of the 
activities of the Mysore upland in 1830, and provided an ideological centring of the uprising 
there.’172
 
We can assume that Buda Basveppa’s and Rungappah Nayak’s efforts to sever the Malnad 
from the state of Mysore were one of the main causes of the Nagar rebellion. Without their 
leadership most of the kuttams would most likely not have gathered and the kuttams that did 
gather would probably have dispersed sooner than was the case. 
 
The combination of all the above elements worked together to cause the rebellion in Nagar. 
That there was no single reason is suggested by the statement of the Foujdar of Chittledroog, 
when asked by the Committee about his opinion as to what might be the causes of the 
uprisings: ‘The reason was not ascertained by my enquiry. There were a hundred reasons on 
the subject among the people.’173  
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7. Governance of Nagar 
 
 
In addition to the influence held by the poligars and adventurers, the influence of the 
administrative elite governing Nagar constituted another special condition in the area. The 
state administration of the district was definitely a contributing factor to the events that took 
place in 1830 and ‘The Report’ of the Committee gives valuable information on that topic. 
The rest of the thesis will, therefore focus on the governance of Nagar as it is mainly revealed, 
through ‘The Report’ and interviews done by the Committee. This material gives a unique 
glimpse in to an early 19th century administration in a Native State under the British Empire in 
India. I will outline the Nagar administration’s policy concerning the governance of Nagar, 
then show the relations to Durbar and Hoozoor at Mysore as well as the administrator’s 
possible participation in the Nagar rebellion.  
 
This chapter is mainly based on the rumours and statements given in the interviews before the 
Committee and on ‘The Committees Report’. The chapter deals with the brahmanical elite 
that governed Nagar Foujdari, this elite’s relation to the Rajah and its connection to the 
rebellion. 
 
Maratha Brahmins in positions 
 
In the late 18th century and the early 19th century people from southern Maratha country 
spread all over South India. These were Brahmins seeking service, refugees escaping hunger 
and young men joining the army or whoever else paid for their military services. Many of the 
Maratha Brahmins became administrators of their skills of literacy. Some came from families 
with traditions of administrative service. In many kingdoms and districts in South India, 
including Mysore, elites rose within the administration, whose members cooperated on 
revenue, tax and judicial affairs: ‘Although many Maratha Brahmins were employed in the 
service of Hyder and Tippu, a greater penetration of them into the service was witnessed 
during the Dewanship of Purnaiah and the succeeding years.’174
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The Maratha Brahmins were ambitious and self-conscious concerning their position in the 
social and administrative hierarchy. J. B. W. Dykes, an Indian Collector in Salem in the 
Madras Presidency in 1858 wrote: ‘A Brahmin never considers himself of any nation; he is 
"twice-born" and by virtue of this...is bound by no such ties... he fully believes that all 
financial affairs will be administrated as hitherto…[in the south] through those ‘twice-born’ 
that speak the Maratha language.’175 The nepotistic system based on selection of positions 
strictly among caste-members became characteristic of the Brahmins when they had 
established themselves in a realm, whether it was a kingdom or a district in Madras 
Presidency. ‘It would have been important for a Brahman group to gain the king’s ear; for by 
winning his confidence, the administrative hierarchy could gradually be filled with family and 
caste members.’176 To be the dominant caste, or elite, in one area the members had to control 
the resources, have access to land, connection with the ruling authority, be of high ritual 
standing and have sufficient physical numbers to retain power.177
...[S]uch a group might silently gain an inner control finding nourishment within the 
body of political organization without disturbing the crust or causing the umbrella of 
authority to collapse. It may be supposed that such a group could effectively slacken 
or tighten the reins of power, silently supporting or undermining the strength of the 
ruling prince. Only occasionally, if the umbrella of authority were too decrepit or if a 
caste elite were too strong, ambitious, or foolish, might there be a danger of 
disintegration. Presumably, such a political system could have had a moderating 
influence upon an autocratic and often despotic rule; for by its very nature it would 
tend to limit the excesses both of central and of local power.178
In the large district of Guntur, situated along the coast in northern Madras Presidency, 
Maratha Brahmins held most of the positions in the middle management in the first half of the 
19th century.179 Robert Eric Frykenberg did a case-study of Guntur District in which he 
describes how a Maratha Brahmin named Shashagiri Rao completely took over the 
administration of the district and filled all the posts with his relatives.  
...[b]y 1845 Walter Elliot obtained a list which showed that ‘seventy four servants of 
all grades where [Shashagiri Rao’s] own relatives or connected with him by family 
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ties, independent of a still larger number attached to him by friendship or the bonds of 
gratitude and common interests’.180
Maratha Brahmins in Guntur were go-betweens who were loyal neither to the local society 
nor to the central authority. They followed their own agenda, which mainly focused on how to 
enrich themselves and their kin.181 The central, authorities, including the British in Guntur 
and, as was suggested earlier, the Rajah in Mysore, became dependant upon their services. 
Henry Rickets in a report published 1858 for the Commissioner for the Revision of Civil 
Salaries and Establishment, asked: ‘Is there anything about Madras Collectorates that makes 
them so difficult that only a Maratha Brahmin can fathom it?’182 In Mysore and especially in 
Nagar a similar development took place. 
 
The elite governing Nagar and relations to the Rajah’s court 
 
Under Purnaiya it appears that the ambitions of Maratha Brahmins in royal service had been 
kept in check. However, after his death, in a short time-span the administrative elite of 
Maratha Brahmins changed their agenda, towards self-ambition and personal benefits. The 
young Rajah of Mysore became gradually dependant upon skilled Maratha Brahmins: ‘Hence 
it was but natural that the Maharaja had to depend on the powerful class of men who had 
excelled in manoeuvre and manipulation.’183 The best way to make a good career in the state 
administration was through friends, relatives and caste and ‘Marathas jealously guarded the 
approaches to the highest offices in the Huzur [Hoozoor] Cutcherry."184
 
A class of new wealth had made their way up in the hierarchy both in Mysore and in the 
districts. According to Ramiah, an officer located in Shimoga during the disturbances, they 
had obtained their wealth through ‘receiving bribes, presents, jagirs, cajoling speeches and 
parasitical exploitation’. 185 They had also used their influence to control the appointments of 
Amildars. Ramiah explained to the Committee how this new class of rich people had arranged 
that a Dewan of their recommending was appointed and how they entered into agreements 
with him that stipulated that positions of importance should be filled by persons of their party. 
They had obtained bribes and presents through these persons and recommended them for the 
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head of departments in the different cutcherees. The same people had been able to receive 
valuable presents of money, land and jewellery from the Rajah, often through the pretence of 
service as intermediaries between the Rajah and the Resident.186 Ram Rao and his related 
dependants, Beenee Venketsoobiah and Chowdiah were amongst the persons belonging to 
this class of parvenus. Because of their advantageous position, royal kin, the Arus, also made 
their fortunes by utilizing their close relations to the Rajah. 
 
Already in 1806, it was noticed by the Company that Maratha Brahmins had infiltrated the 
administration on several levels in Mysore. In addition the Company noticed that the Rajah’s 
soldiers were mostly Marathas, and that the system of armed local police, Candachar Peons, 
was hard to introduce in Nagar.187 Nagar District was mainly controlled by one party of 
Maratha Brahmins, who resisted central governance and directives. 
 
From 1811, when the Rajah took over rule of Mysore, his closest advisor during his reign was 
Ram Rao. Ram Rao’s two close friends, Bheem Rao of the Anegerry family and his son-in-
law Kishen Rao of the Haneegul family, both Maharatta Brahmins like himself, followed him 
into service in the state of Mysore and in the district of Nagar. Their friends and relatives 
filled several positions in the administration at the capital and even more positions in Nagar. 
One Rama Rao was appointed Foujdar of Nagar in 1799 by Purnaya. Sowar Bakshi 
Rama Rao, Bargir Bakshi Balaji Rao, Babu Rao and Bhim Rao of Annigere were 
some of the notable figures among this class. Rama Rao, by his sheer influence filled 
all the higher posts in the Foujdary of Nagar with his relatives and the members of the 
Annigere and Hanagal families. 188
Ram Rao was Foujdar of Nagar from 1799 to 1805. In these years and those following, most 
of the important positions in Nagar, especially the Amildaris were filled up with family 
members and friends, including the above mentioned persons. Through marriage links and 
exchange of gifts and bribes, other prominent persons became dependant upon Ram Rao and 
his faction, including the prominent members of the families of Anegerry and Haneegul. From 
1805 to 1825, with the exception of just six months, all persons who succeeded Ram Rao in 
the position of Foujdar in Nagar were attached to him either by blood or marriage. Servottum 
Rao was twice Foujdar of Nagar – his son was married to Ram Rao’s niece Pompiah. Ram 
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Rao’s grandnephew Balakishen Rao was Foujdar of Nagar for a period. The same was Ram 
Rao’s son-in-law, the infamous Kishen Rao. Servottum Rao had two sons-in-law placed as 
Amildars in Nagar, namely Runga Rao in Honelly talook and Sreenevas Rao in Kumsi talook. 
Other relatives of Ram Rao also played prominent parts in the developments in Nagar 
Foujdari, for instance Gopal Rao and Luchmun Rao. 
 
Vencata Kistniah, Foujdar of Manjarbad in 1827, stated his impression to the writers of ‘The 
Report’ that all the Nagar Amildars were either friends or relatives of Ram Rao. Vencata 
Kistniah had first hand information on these matters because he accompanied Ram Rao in his 
investigation into the Nagar affairs of 1827. The Committee presented him with a complete 
list of all of the names of Nagar Amildars and he confirmed that each one was either a relative 
or friend of Ram Rao.189 Annapah confirmed the same when he was interviewed by the 
Committee: ‘[Question:] How many friends or relations of Ram Rao were employed as 
Amildars in Nuggur before the insurrection? [Answer:] I have heard that they were employed 
in seven or eight talooks.’190
 
Ram Rao’s party was also associated with the majority of the other persons holding power 
and influence. The Resident Sheristardar Chowdiah was mentioned by several of the persons 
interviewed. He used the potential sanctions imposed by the Resident as threats towards the 
Rajah and was reported to have stated the following: ‘If you do not follow this advice the 
Resident may perhaps come himself and assume the reins of Government.’191 He played on 
his power, lending it to the highest bidder: ‘Chowdiah was also in the habit of visiting the 
Hoozoor and state that it was the Gentleman’s [the Resident] order that such and such persons 
should be nominated to certain offices.’192 Chowdiah carried out his own agenda. He 
protected his family, manoeuvred and manipulated, and used the Resident’s name to have 
prisoners executed. Several of the persons on Chowdiah’s execution-list in Chenroyapatam 
were people who presented complaints about the Amildars who were associated with him.193 
A person named Maray Gowda was hanged without trial, on Chowdiah’s orders, which were 
presented as the Residents’ recommendation. ‘[Question] Who was the Amildar of 
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Honnwutty against whom Maray Gowda was about to prove corruption? [Answer] He was 
brother in-law to Chowdiah the Resident’s Maatsuddy.’194
 
Most of the persons interviewed stated that Beenee Venketsoobiah, in addition to Ram Rao, 
was one of the two people who controlled most of the appointments to the positions as 
Foujdars, Amildars and Sheristadars, especially for the Nagar District administration. Beenee 
Venketsoobiah, also called Beenee Buckshee, was described by the Resident and the writers 
of ‘The Report’ as ‘a Brahmin of the worst character’.195 He was a musician by profession, 
and, as an entertainer at the court, he positioned himself to be one of the Rajah’s closest 
advisors. 
 
A few of the witnesses interviewed described Chowdiah as being at the centre of the web, 
together with Venketsoobiah, and that candidates to public offices were mostly nominated by 
these two, and that the nominees usually were friends or relatives of them. Gooreekar 
Madapah, a close servant to the Rajah, answered the Committee: ’[Question:] Was it the 
belief generally in the country that these improper persons received their situations through 
bribery? [Answer:] It was generally the opinion that they obtained their offices by bribing the 
Dewan, Chowdiah and Venketsoobiah.’196
 
There are two main factions, or parties, who distinguished themselves in the power struggle. 
One is Ram Rao’s party and the other one is the Arus’ of the royal family, including Vera Raj 
Arus, Vencata Raj Arus and Timmapah Raj Arus – all three persons at one point holding the 
situation as Foujdar of Nagar. Arus is the family name of the Mysore nobles of the royal 
lineage. 
 
Chowdiah and Beenee Venketsoobiah being collaborators played other elite groups against 
each other and manoeuvred in ways that suited them best, even though the latter person at 
most times was involved with Ram Rao’s faction. The royal family was not less corrupt than 
their opponents. Sometimes the two main parties struggled hard and competed for positions, 
and at other times they cooperated either to fool Rajah or to win his favour. Runga Rao, the 
amil of Honelly, told the writers of ‘The Report’ that there was a constant struggle at the 
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central Government administration between these two factions. ‘Thus both these parties 
greatly embarrassed the Rajah’.197 An illustration of this power struggle is the fact that the 
criminals earlier mentioned were arrested or released dependant upon the shifting balance of 
power and change of people who decided in these matters.198 The manoeuvrings of the Raos 
and the Arus can also be observed in the appointments of Foujdars to Nagar District. Before 
1825, practically all Foujdars were adherent to Ram Rao’s party. From 1825 to 1831 these 
persons were Foujdars in Nagar:  
 
Name:   Period in office:  Allegiance: 
Servottum Rao  Until 1825   (Ram Raos party) 
Vencata Raj Arus 1826     (Royal family) 
Timmapah Raj Arus 1826    (Royal family) 
Kishen Rao  1827     (Ram Raos party) 
Vera Raj Arus  1828 – 30   (Royal family) 
Kishen Rao  Nov.1830 – Jan. 1831 (Ram Raos party) 
Annapah  Jan. 1831 –       (Presumably no allegiance) 
 
Twice the Rajah removed a Foujdar from Ram Rao’s party, viz. Servottum Rao and Kishen 
Rao, and replaced him with one from his own relatives, namely Venkataj Raj Arus and Vera 
Raj Arus. He was aware of the stronghold Ram Rao’s party had developed in Nagar Foujdari 
and at Hoozoor and attempted to strengthen his own party of relatives. However, he remained 
powerless and outnumbered. 
[Question:] Did the Rajah know that persons in his Durbar conferred situations for 
bribes? [Answer:] He knew it, but what could he do? He had not the power of 
checking them. They would frequently bring him threatening messages, as from the 
Gentleman and intimidate him by saying that the Gentleman would be angry and bring 
him into some trouble.199
However, much of this power-play was concerning the daily affairs at the Hoozoor, in the 
state capital of Mysore, or served as struggles for the influential administrative positions in 
other districts than Nagar. In Nagar Foujdari Ram Rao’s party had the upper hand at most 
times and controlled the rural elite there.  
[Question:] By whose influence /or patronage/ were the Amildars principally 
appointed? [Answer:] Through the influence of Buckshee Ram Rao’s party, the friends 
and natives of Hanegul Krishna Rao and of Annagherry Gopal Row were nominated 
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to these offices in the talooks of the Nuggur district. … [Question:] Was the Buckshee 
Ram Rao equally influential, whether he were at the Hoozoor or in the districts? 
[Answer:] Yes! He possessed great influence both in the districts and at the 
Hoozoor.200
The Committee thought that the Nagar District was in practice ruled by a single, determined, 
related elite faction, supported in the Hoozoor and the Durbar by influential patrons. The 
consequence of this monopolisation of power by rural elite was not beneficial to the people in 
Nagar District. The Committee was not merciful in ‘The Report’ in their characterisation of 
Ram Rao’s associates. They were simply described by the Committee, as bandits and 
corrupted characters with doubtful careers: 
Though many of the members of these families were not only suspected but accused of 
flagrant frauds and embezzlements ... even of giving encouragement to a notorious 
leader of marauding banditti, and partaking of the plunder, the influence of their 
patron, and the brahmanical party at Court which clung to him, maintained their 
places, and shielded them from scrutiny into their conduct. They were thus left to 
pursue unchecked their career of corruption and misrule 201
The Brahmin party of Ram Rao’s dependants in the Hoozoor protected each other from 
investigation and punishment and were allowed to position their favourites, collect bribes and 
enrich themselves, with a special focus on their advantageous position in Nagar District. Mr. 
Casamaijor, the almost invisible Resident, was used as a potential sanction whose purpose 
was to limit the Rajahs ability to act against misconduct. In the next paragraphs I will describe 
how this monopoly of administrative power was taken advantage of in Nagar Foujdari. 
 
Brutal revenue collection 
 
Most witnesses interviewed revealed brutality in Nagar District in different forms, executed 
by the Amildars and their servants. Amildars occasionally resorted to the use of force to 
compel outstanding revenue, taxes and when imposing forced labour upon the peasants. 
Witnesses told the Committee stories of flogging and torture. Every now and then hostages 
were taken, usually women and children, and kept in confinement until the rent was paid. 
Mullaganee, a peasant from Hurrunguttay in Shimoga talook, told the Committee that the 
village headmen, on behalf of the Amildars, pushed for increased rents over a period of two 
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years previous to the insurrection. Those who cannot pay rent ‘are beaten, stones placed on 
their heads, and the money collected.’202 Another witness told a story about a woman who 
was raped by the landlords and their servants. Annapah stated to the Committee: ‘I heard that 
they collected the money from the ryots by flogging them with…whips and placing them in 
confinement. … If the ryots lie and conceal, the women and children are sent for.’203
 
Some Amildars forced the peasants to sell their horses and other belongings, and often they 
spared nothing. These stories could be exaggerated. The Committee wrote in ‘The Report’ 
that they were uncertain whether they could believe all the cruel stories told to them by some 
persons. Most of the witnesses, with administrative positions, and the military personnel, had 
not seen or heard of much violence. Some of the prominent persons only referred to stories 
they had heard being told by the peasants, and not to incidents they had experienced 
themselves. On the other hand, in his study of politics and culture of landholding in 18th 
century Bengal, John R. McLane, describes how physical coercion was a routine in collection 
of rent.204 Authority to enforce payment by use of torture, whipping and beating, was 
delegated to person assigned to gather revenue – all the way through the hierarchy from the 
Zamindar’s servants to revenue farmers and intermediaries beneath the Zamindars. Earlier I 
described the violence and kidnappings that took place during the insurrection, a result of 
dislike towards certain Amildars and Foujdars. It seems that at some level there had existed 
prior tension between the representatives of the Nagar regime and the peasants.  
 
Corruption  
 
Pamela Price’s study of nineteenth-century Zamindars under the reign of Madras Presidency 
in Tamil country, together with Frykenberg’s study of Guntur District, indicates that 
corruption was widespread in South India in the 19th century. A Zamindar was the holder of a 
zamindari, a revenue estate (often corresponding to a pre-colonial little kingdom), in which 
the Zamindar was responsible for revenue collection. The system was introduced by the 
Company and a Zamindar was often formerly a poligar.  
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Pamela Price proposes: ‘that corrupt actions result not just from a straightforward desire for 
material aggrandisement, but are also or even primarily important tools for political 
negotiation and the achievement and/-or protection of unstable rank and status.’205 Price 
suggests that, in India, headship of a political faction or other kind of domain is modelled on 
notions of lordship and that the lord or ‘patron exerts personal authority allowing his 
subordinates to build, protect and sustain their own personal domains.’206 In Price’s study of 
the nineteenth-century Ramnad, a zamindari in Tamil country, she found that largess became 
one of the most important methods for the zamindari lord to develop networks of support. 
Presents in the form of land, cash, clothes and jewels, and bribes were tools to bind followers.  
In the absence of more direct tools, namely legitimate armies, largess gained in 
prominence. The Zamindar as a vallal [a man of largess, of generosity] exerted the 
royal prerogative of social ordering, affecting the local status of his subjects through 
distribution of the resources of his domain.207  
The largesse and the right to determine distribution of wealth, are both regarded as notions of 
lordship, meant to be tools to achieve and confirm high status. Price further states: ‘What 
Frykenberg’s study of local colonial administration and my study of zamindari management 
suggest is that subordinates felt that they had the right to carve out their own micro-areas 
inside wider structures of rule.’208 Corruption became a strategy for gaining status. 
 
Subsequent to the Rajah’s assumption of power in 1811 the Amildars increasingly turned 
corrupt. The shurtee system that let the highest bidders receive Amildar posts, and the fact 
that the factions in the central administration influenced the employment of officers, led to a 
gradual replacement of the experienced Amildars, by persons who sought to make easy 
money: ‘… [T]he old and experienced Amildars were displaced and others put in their room 
who were unexperienced and persons set up by those who had their influence at court ….’209 
In addition to this, witnesses stated to the Committee, that the officers who had in Purnaiya’s 
time acted reasonably and efficient also became corrupt and committed grave irregularities 
meant only to suit their own interests.210
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In the Nagar District, where central political control was weak and unstable, the possibilities 
for individuals and kin to carve out personal domains encouraged corruption among elite 
Maratha Brahmins. The Amildars manoeuvred to achieve and uphold their status, not unlikely 
the Maratha Brahmins of Guntur District. In particular cash came to be important for the 
development of domains of influence among servants in Nagar Foujdari. The situation in 
Nagar went out of control and was considered, by witnesses, who appeared before the 
Committee, to be much worse than in any other district in the state of Mysore. Chowdiah, the 
Resident’s Sheristardar, who had no interest in either protecting the Rajah or Ram Rao’s 
party, quoted what he had heard from the ryots of Nagar: ‘The Amildars take bribes from us 
making each of us contribute towards the amount and the custom renters exact undue cesses 
from us.’211 Chowdiah described how the Amildars forced and bribed the Potails to participate 
in pressing the ryots harder for rents and in imposing free labour from the ryots. Corruption 
on this scale was regarded by the inhabitants in Nagar to be a new phenomenon in the District 
and the Amildars’ behaviour was explained as one of the reasons to why the district had fallen 
into disorder in the 1820s: ‘The reasons are that the Amildars have not observed the custom of 
that district.’212
 
Organised crime 
 
The practice of protecting criminals and then receiving a yield of the stolen goods, in return 
for this service, was a widespread custom among officers in Nagar Foujdari. The countryside, 
containing both mountains and forests, combined with shady alliances of public officers and 
bandits, facilitated criminal operations. Foujdar Servottum Rao, a dependant of Ram Rao, 
pressed people for bribes and was directly involved in criminal activities.213 Vencata Raj 
Arus, one of the Rajah’s relatives, who had the position of Dewan during the rebellion, 
followed as Foujdar in Nagar after Servottum Rao, when the latter was removed because of 
gross maladministration. Twice Foujdar Kishen Rao was directly connected to corruption. He 
was removed from office in 1827 accused of embezzling public money, and also removed in 
1830 for alleged inactivity in execution of his duty.214 The decision to remove him from office 
the second time was officially based on the grounds of his incapability to end the insurrection.  
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 The members of Ram Rao’s party in Nagar were involved in crime to a degree that one 
perhaps can maintain that they were criminals themselves. One grave example is the story of 
Goonda. This man, of whom there are few records left, led a gang of bandits collaborating 
with the mentioned Foujdar Servottum Rao, the latter encouraging and protecting him. As a 
return favour Goonda shared the stolen goods with Servottum. Vencata Raj Arus told the 
Committee: ‘I examined Goonda when he stated as follows[:] ‘The property and money which 
I plundered in some places were given by me to Servootum Rao’’.215 Goonda was for a period 
also associated with Foujdar Kishen Rao. The Foujdars involved in these scandals, and most 
Amildars involved in similar cases, were occasionally charged with allegations of corruption, 
and they were sometimes punished, but then usually reinstated back into their positions. 
Goonda himself was released from prison twice, even after being found undeniably guilty of 
committing robberies.216 The same treatment usually also applied to his accomplices who 
carried out the essential jobs in the crimes. Runga Rao claimed that Goondas robberies could 
be traced to, via Servottum Rao and Kishen Rao, to Buckshee Ram Rao and Beenee 
Venketsoobiah, and that the former person acted as Goondas patron.217 The panchayat, which 
was formed to investigate Servottum Rao’s alleged connections with Goonda and the robbers, 
consisted merely of persons close connected to Servottum Rao and Ram Rao, namely Baboo 
Rao, Veera Rao, Tippiah, Gungada Rao and Ram Rao himself. Servottum Rao was only fined 
for his crimes.  
 
There are other stories of organised crime described vaguely and seemingly based upon 
rumours, for instance, one incredible story about the robbery of a banking house in 1827. In 
this case it was suspected that the Foujdar Kishen Rao and the Amildar of Chinnagerry, 
Anegerry Venket Rao, supported the gang of robbers and also participated in the plunder. All 
attempts to investigate failed because of Buckshee Ram Rao’s influence at the Durbar: ‘The 
officer sent to conduct it was suddenly recalled to Mysore, and the investigation allowed to 
drop.’218 This particular story is exclusively based upon rumours that circulated in the whole 
of Mysore state. Nonetheless, together with the other stories, where circumstantial evidence 
exists, one can suspect that the rumours point to historical conditions which are supported by 
statements like this: 
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[Question:] Have robberies been more or less frequent in the country of late years then 
they were formerly? [Answer:] Latterly the robberies have increased. [Question:] 
From what cause? [Answer:] From the absence of investigation on the part of the 
Sirkar.219
We can assert that some officers cooperated to a certain extent with criminal elements and 
that this could have caused a strained relation between themselves and the local population, as 
the Committee observes: ‘[These circumstances] have been productive of such an impression 
on the mind of the people to the disadvantage of the Government…’220
 
An important aspect is that the justice system was not altogether helpless. The officers were 
occasionally investigated, convicted and punished. Therefore, an interesting feature of this 
discussion is how the officers’ self-respect dropped during the 1820s, and how this hardened 
their attitude towards their own subordinates. Mark Cubbon remarked: 
The Amils were sometimes confined in irons, for corruption, or neglect of duty, or 
summoned to Hoozoor, and exposed before the Palace, with their faces covered in 
mud, and with pincers on their ears, they were occasionally flogged ...; yet such men 
were not by any means looked upon as disgraced, but were frequently re-appointed to 
office, and some of the talook servants now in employ, are said to have formerly 
suffered such inflictions. The natural consequences of this was the extinction of all self 
respect and honorable feeling amongst the public servants.221
However, respect and obedience towards officers and their authority still prevailed, a point 
emphasised by military witnesses based upon observations on how the rebels in most cases 
treated the Amildars and other officers representing the Government. It seems that the hatred 
had been built up and became directed towards specific persons, especially Kishen Rao. He 
was regarded by the peasants to be a cruel man. Seebiah, a former Sheristardar of the 
Dewan’s cutcherree answered to the Committee:  
[Question:] Why were the Ryots dissatisfied with the second appointment of Krishna 
Row to the Foujdaree? [Answer:] Both because of his severity in enforcing payment of 
the revenue and because the Poligars had promised the Ryots to remit part of what 
they owed to the Sircar, if they would join their standard.222
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The elites at court and in the state administration combined to influence appointments 
throughout Mysore. Nagar Foujdari was left alone to Ram Rao’s party, where the members of 
this faction seemingly unhindered engaged in corruption, crime and violent methods of 
collection of rent. Evidence further suggests the lengths to which members of the faction 
would protect their influenced: the rebellion could have been indirectly instigated by the 
leaders of Ram Rao’s Brahmanical party. 
 
Ram Rao’s party and the rebellion 
 
Seebiah told the Committee that the insurrection was triggered by Vera Raj Arus’ attempt to 
collect the balance which had been remitted earlier by Ram Rao. Vera Raj Arus was removed 
because in this process he revealed gross corruption: ‘I have heard that Kishen Row [,] fearful 
that his malpractice and those of his father /uncle/ would be exposed of if Veer Raj Arus 
continued in the office of Foujdar, induced the ryots to rise in Cottum.’223
 
Indicia can support the claim that the first uprisings were instigated by the Brahmin party 
connected to Ram Rao, by persons associated with and/-or paid by this party, with the purpose 
to have Veera Raj Arus removed from office and Kishen Rao reinstated as Foujdar. The 
Committee wrote in ‘The Report’ that they are quite certain that a conspiracy took place with 
this purpose. The Committee considered Ram Rao’s brother in law, Luchmun Rao, who 
arranged Buda Basveppas marriage, to be the focal point of this conspiracy, and referred to a 
letter from him: 
This document ... which has been admitted to be genuine by its author Luchmun Rao 
himself, in our opinion strongly tend[s] to prove, that at least there were some among 
the members of Buckshee Ram Rao’s party who instigated the people to sedition, for 
the purpose of, we may reasonably conclude, of effecting the removal of the Foujdar 
Veera Rai Arus, and of thereby securing themselves in the enjoyment of place and 
power, and escaping the disgrace and punishment which his inquiries would probably 
have brought down upon them.224
Luchmun Rao had served as Amildar in several talooks. His elder sister was married to Ram 
Rao, thus he drew on the advantage of his acquaintance with a mighty patron. Luchmun 
declared to the Committee that he first noticed that Buda Basveppa was called Nuggur Poligar 
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in August 1830, but admitted to the Committee that he heard rumours already in April, 
subsequent to Buda’s wedding, that Buda Basveppa had taken the name Nuggur Khawind 
(Rajah of Nagar). He did not consider Buda to be the rightful Nagar sovereign, but still issued 
the sunnud mentioned before proclaiming Buda as sovereign of Nuggur. Luchmun denied this 
to the Committee, saying that he was not aware of the content of the sunnud because he could 
not read Kannada. He claimed that he believed he had signed a requisition for firewood for 
Buda’s wedding, but that he was tricked by a person called Deshkar Sreenappah. There is no 
other mention of this person.225 The Committee wrote:  
To what extent the party of the Buckshee Ram Rao, with the view of bringing about 
the removal of Veer Raj Arus, may have encouraged these proceedings, we do not feel 
ourselves able to say. It is certain, however, that in the instance above stated 
encouragement was given to them by one member of that party; and it cannot be 
doubted that they never could have taken place, and passed as they did without notice, 
if other public officers, besides that one, had not been at least guilty of gross neglect of 
their duty, and disregard of the interest of the Government they served.226
Other persons connected to Ram Rao were also involved. In September, in the Nagar talook 
of Chinnagerry, the ryots were encouraged by a letter from Gopal Rao, a member of the 
Anegerry-family related to Ram Rao and Kishen Rao, to start an uprising against the local 
Amildar – who was not of Ram Rao’s party.227 The letter, which was presumed to be in Gopal 
Rao’s handwriting, recommended that the ryots not return to the villages even if the Rajah of 
Mysore asked them to. The peasants and potails were easily persuaded because they were 
already annoyed by the fear of having to pay the remitted rents: ‘… there is evidence that 
these various moves were tacitly supported, perhaps inspired, by some Maharatta Brahman 
officials seeking to embarrass a member of the Mysore royal family…’228
 
To conclude, it seems that certain indications points towards a planned conspiracy staged by 
members of Buckshee Ram Rao’s party, including Beenee Venketsoobiah, in alliance with 
their client village head men. In their attempts to, once again out-manoeuvre the Rajah, 
members of the faction went so far as to instigate an uprising in Nagar District – or the 
Brahmin alliance was at least one of the major factors that contributed to the outbreak of the 
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insurrection. However, the rebellion, instigated with the purpose of removing Vera Raj Arus, 
spread unexpectedly far and fast and ended not according to the plans behind the plot. It 
ended with British take-over of Mysore. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
 
Stephen Blake offers a model which describes the patrimonial-bureaucratic state, 
in order to explain the administration of the Mughal Empire. This is an 
ideal type of a state. The patrimonial-bureaucratic state is an extension of the 
patrimonial state, which Stephen Blake describes, drawing upon Max Weber’s work:  
The ruler of such a state [the patrimonial state] governs on the basis of a personal, 
traditional authority whose model is the patriarchal family. Patrimonial domination 
originates in the patriarch’s authority over his household; it entails obedience to a 
person, not an office; it depends on the reciprocal loyalty between a subject and his 
master; and it is limited only by the ruler’s discretion.229
The state becomes patrimonial when the ruler’s authority extends from patrimonial household 
to the political sphere – the revenue, military and judicial – and thus controlling other 
patrimonial masters, namely local lords and chiefs. The larger realm will then be seen as a 
huge household. In the smaller kingdoms there was little difference between functionaries of 
the state and household officials. In larger and more complex patrimonial-bureaucratic 
empires the rulers could lose control of administration and, ‘Under such conditions the 
strength of personal, patrimonial authority began to wane and officials began to appropriate 
prebends and declare their independence.’230 In patrimonial- bureaucratic regimes, the ruler 
and his advisors had to be constantly on the alert against subordinates who would undermine 
the authority of the central government.  
 
When the Mysore state became more centralised under Hyder Ali, Tipu Sultan and Purnaiya, 
elements of bureaucratic rule came into governance. The Mysore Kingdom then resembled 
the patrimonial-bureaucratic state model which Blake describes. One cause for the 
centralisation was warfare and the presence of large standing military forces, which lead to an 
increased need for efficient administration and control of resources: 
To compete militarily against rivals, states were forced to expand their powers of 
taxation as well as conceive other methods by which to command wealth and income. 
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This led to the development of new, more centralised state formations that had greater 
control over resources within their territories.231
Blake focuses not solely upon the ruler’s role as patriarch; however, Blake also considers the 
patrimonial elements in the operation and outline of administration. In patrimonial-
bureaucratic empires the state and the household officials could become separated spheres. 
This extension of control beyond the household domain required extra-patrimonial officials 
who administered the collection of taxes and the judicial affairs. In patrimonial-bureaucratic 
states resources became more and more beyond the ruler’s control, and officials declared their 
independence.  
 
The Mysore state as it appeared in the years prior to the insurrection resembled the 
patrimonial-bureaucratic state model that Blake presents. In Mysore a service elite of Maratha 
Brahmins had filled most of the administrative positions since the late 18th century. They were 
foreigners recruited as administrators. The shurtee system allowed for the administration of 
revenue to be constantly changed and the new elites of Maratha Brahmins increasingly 
received positions which they only held for a couple of years at a time. These new elites and 
administrators were not recruited in traditional patrilineal sense, i.e., because of close kin 
and/-or personal ties, but because of the need for administrators in the new semi-
bureaucratised state. 
 
The kings of Native States were deprived of their military advantage in the early 19th century, 
either by the abolition of military forces or by severe restrictions on armed defence, a 
development directed by the new overlord, the Company. Pamela Price describes how one 
Zamindar in Tamil country dealt with this situation:  ‘The Setupati lost his armies and his 
right to adjudicate after the Permanent Settlement [1801 – 03], but he did not lose his capacity 
to affect social and political ordering. This a ruler did through controlling access to 
resources.’232 A way to control the resources, and to prevent the fragmentation of status, was 
through spending money on building support, or royal largesse:  
Contradiction among principles of political action was an creative element in patterns 
of state formation during the late precolonial period. In the nineteenth century, in the 
context of a new type of overlord, these elements of fragmenting tension would prove 
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destructive, contributing to the fragmentation of precolonial monarchical cosmology. 
The desire to reproduce royal honour and status was a dynamical element in 
continuing evolution of monarchical ideology in the course of the nineteenth 
century.233
This largesse became a powerful tool: ‘for protecting and enhancing royal authority in the 
attempt to fulfil common expectations of appropriate behaviour for a royal personage.’234 The 
Rajah of Mysore, as well, had limited power and status, compared to pre-colonial kings, and 
in a similar manner as the Zamindars of Tamil country, his actions can be seen in this light: he 
attempted to reproduce his royal status and honour. Through royal largesse and gift-giving the 
Rajah endeavoured to sustain, or moreover, regain his status. 
  
According to Blake the patrimonial-bureaucratic state shaped district 
officer positions with overlapping responsibilities. In addition, 
patrimonial-bureaucratic officials frequently filled positions that were not clearly defined and 
imperfectly structured, thus allowing the local administrators to some extent to define their 
power spheres themselves. According to Pamela Price, in concept of dharma lies the idea that 
persons have the right to build and protect domains of their own, within the natural given 
restraints their position in the hierarchy. That means that subordinate civil servants felt they 
had the privilege to enhance their own honour and develop, on different levels, their own 
possibilities for patronage. Civil servants and administrators on all levels use the same tools as 
the king, though on a smaller scale. In this system all positions in the hierarchy attempt to 
follow the example of their superiors and carve out their domains. 
 
There are indications of a growing conflict between the two different Mysore state 
institutions, the Hoozoor and Durbar, which fit into the discussion of difference between 
centralised patrimonial-bureaucracy and patrimonial state governance. The Hoozoor and the 
Durbar represented different connotations of royal power. A bureaucratisation of state 
administration from the Muslim Sultan’s time to Purnaiya’s and the Rajah’s rule in the early 
19th century should have made the Hoozoor into a place where the ruler’s will and authority 
over the districts met and formed a single institution. Patrimonial bureaucratisation implied 
separation of lower responsibilities; revenue, magisterial and judicial. In Mysore the Hoozoor 
was a central unit, that is, it resided in Mysore. In the sources, we observe, for instance, that 
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corrupt officers were sent from the districts to appear before the Hoozoor, that officers were 
detached from the Hoozoor to investigate affairs in the districts and that the Hoozoor stored 
archives containing official communication.  
 
The Durbar was a royal court. Rajah led assemblies in the Durbar hall, where he resembled a 
divine authority. The right to hold Durbar was an important manifestation of royalty for the 
Hindu Woodeyars that reigned in Mysore prior to the period of the Muslim sultans. Kate 
Brittlebank describes the importance of durbar during the annual Dasara festival: 
An important part of the festival was the darbar aspect, where homage was paid to the 
king, gifts were exchanged and the sacrificial reconsecration of the royal arms, 
soldiers, horses and elephants took place. As an essential element of the incorporative 
nature of the whole Dasara ritual, at this time all the subordinate chiefs were required 
to be present.235
In the Durbar royal distribution was symbolically manifested through gift-giving and 
distribution of betel nuts. The Durbar was closely tied to rank, as a visual display of order of 
things, and a place to manifest respect, while the Hoozoor, having bureaucratic elements of 
administration, supervised the officers of the Foujdaris and the talooks. 
 
It looks as if the as if department mandates and administrative positions were not clearly 
defined in the state of Mysore during the time of Krishnaraja Woodeyar III. They seem to 
have been imperfectly structured, with overlapping responsibilities, resembling the 
patrimonial-bureaucratic state type that Blake proposes. The Rajah was losing 
control of resources and positions and Maratha Brahmins, relatives of Rajah and other 
characters like Beenee Venketsoobiah and Chowdiah manoeuvred to carve out their domains. 
Ram Rao held different positions through his career, Foujdar in Nagar, positions in the Civil 
Office, commander of the Cavalry and at one time he functioned as a Dewan. However, Ram 
Rao is always referred to as a member of the Hoozoor. ‘Ram Rao was on of the “Hoozoor 
Moosahibs”, or persons habitually consulted by the Rajah on public affairs.’236 It seems that 
the Hoozoor was the centre of influence in Mysore and that the foreign Brahmin 
administrators were aware of this. There are indications that the state of Mysore struggled 
with problems of defining the spheres of the Hoozoor and the Durbar. It seems that the 
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different factions struggled for increased power within the new bureaucratic structures in a 
patrimonial-bureaucratic state. The insurrection tells us that the nature of governance in this 
patrimonial-bureaucratic regime was fragile and the leadership incapable of upholding an 
effective state administration. The Rajah did not manage to fill his position as king in a way 
that would have made the governance of Mysore work effectively.  
 
In Nagar Foujdari the Brahmin administrators, mostly recruited among the dependants of Ram 
Rao, acted on their own within their undefined spheres, attempting to take advantage of the 
possibilities given within the system: their protection by patrons at the central administration 
and the advantages of the shurtee system. And like the Zamindars in Tamil country: ‘Cash 
and other movable gifts became essential for the development of secret domains of influence 
among local servants of the state.’237
 
Parallel to the manoeuvring of Maratha Brahmin officers, the Nagar poligars attempted to 
reproduce their lost status. Pamela Price study of Zamindars in Tamil Country in the 19th 
century shows us that even under direct British administration, in Madras Presidency, poligars 
struggled to reproduce their ruling status. 
 
In Mysore the poligars were to some degree pacified by Tipu Sultan at the end of the 18th 
century. However, their descendants carried claims to power. Like other places in South India 
the descendants of the poligars were representatives of the earlier power of former little kings 
and chieftains and existed side-by-side to the evolving central administration. In Nagar the 
poligars’ attempt to reproduce and regain ruling status and honour coincided with peasants’ 
displeasure with the running of affairs in Nagar and the hardships of economic recession. 
They were helped on the way to revolt by the Maratha Brahmins struggling for dominance. In 
the early stages of the insurrection the poligars were seen as a tool for the faction of Maratha 
Brahmins related to Ram Rao in their intriguing against the royal faction. The poligars, 
however, had their own agenda. They were on a mission of recovering the past as the future – 
to recover what they felt was their ancestral domains. Their ambitions were directly linked to 
a sense of loss on their behalf – loss of land, territory and prestige. 
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One might say that the Rajah, the Amildars, other officers and the poligars in varying degree 
and with different methods all aiming to reproduce honour and status, and increase and 
uphold their domains. The peasants residing in Nagar District, however, wanted to improve 
their welfare. The peasant’s ambitions were linked to different types of losses: loss of money 
due to the increased revenue demand, decreased standards of living and loss of safety due to 
hard times given them by the Amildars in the 1820’s. In the insurrection, however, the 
peasants and the poligars became linked together. In ‘The Committees Report’, little is stated 
regarding the peasant’s forms of political action and/-or their values. However, in the 
Committee’s notes we can find several ‘voices’ on their behalf. Concerning the peasant’s 
forms of political action, it seems that kuttam was one of the few options left for them to 
express protest. Holee Mutha Sidda Gowdah, headman in the Seera Talook, stated to the 
Committee that during the ‘old days’ and in Purnaiya’s time the ryots could bring forward 
their complaints to the Rajah. But not anymore, the Amildars would beat them and trouble 
them on the way. The peasants had stopped going to Mysore for redress, he told the 
Committee. During the rebellion, the peasants received letters encouraging them to gather in 
kuttams, and so they did.238 Most of the witnesses said that to rise in kuttam was a tradition in 
Mysore. Kullay Gowda from Bookapatnam in Seera talook stated to the Committee that 
kuttam was a last resort, prior to the insurrection: ‘If the ryots were dissatisfied with an 
amildar, it has been an ancient custom for the whole of them to rise in Cootum, that is, if they 
have no other means left of obtaining justice /or means/ they assembled in Cootum.’239
 
From the Committee’s papers we can also find evidence regarding the peasants’ values and 
their view on the Rajah and government matters, apart from their disgruntlement concerning 
increased rents and imposed labour. The peasants’ statements indicate that they were to some 
degree aware about the Rajah’s relations to his own advisors and administrators. Kittenhully 
Venkatah Gowda of the Nelwcnigelum Talook stated to the Committee what he believed was 
the general opinion of the Rajah, among the people: ‘There was, is not, and never will be a 
person in the world equal to him, but he has some wicked ministers about him by whose 
means this country has been destroyed.’240 Holee Mutha Sidda Gowdah underlined this when 
he claimed that the Rajah ‘…was much beloved by them. The people offered their prayers to 
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God that he might become more prosperous/or greater…from resigning it to his evil 
counsellors the country has been brought to its present state.’241
 
The Committee’s notes open opportunities for historians to learn more about the society of a 
South Indian Native State under indirect British imperial rule from early 19th century to its 
inclusion into the British Empire in 1831, all dependent upon the questions asked to the 
sources. The material is extensive and vast and I could only make use of small parts in the 
course of writing this thesis. This study could be expanded to include extended data on the 
compound of the rebellion, regarding caste, class and religious belonging – a full-scale 
mapping of the involved persons. Secondly, further research into the political participation, of 
officers, village headmen and ryots, could be an interesting and fruitful task. Thirdly, I 
propose that more work be done on the notions of values of the involved parties in the 
rebellion. The material could be valuable to future scholars regarding further research into 
nature of governance in 19th century South Indian Native States, in comparative studies, 
studies on corruption, and finally, disintegration of indigenous rule under British imperial 
rule.   
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